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Abstract 
This thesis presents a behavioral economics contribution to the security of information systems. 
It focuses on security information sharing (SIS) between operators of critical infrastructures, 
such as systemic banks, power grids, or telecommunications. SIS is an activity by which these 
operators exchange cybersecurity-relevant information, for instance on vulnerabilities, 
malwares, data breaches, etc. Such information sharing is a low-cost and efficient way by 
which the defenders of such infrastructures can enhance cybersecurity. However, despite this 
advantage, economic (dis)incentives, such as the free-rider problem, often reduce the extent to 
which SIS is actually used in practice. 
 This thesis responds to this problem with three published articles. The first article sets out 
a theoretical framework that proposes an association between human behavior and SIS 
outcomes. The second article further develops and empirically tests this proposed association, 
using data from a self-developed psychometric survey among all participants of the Swiss 
Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI). SIS is measured by a 
dual approach (intensity and frequency), and hypotheses on five salient factors that are likely 
associated with SIS outcomes (attitude, reciprocity, executional cost, reputation, trust) are 
tested. In the third article, policy recommendations are presented in order to reduce executional 
costs, which is found to be significantly and negatively associated with SIS. 
 In conclusion, this thesis proposes multiple scientific and practical contributions. It 
extends the scientific literature on the economics of cybersecurity with three contributions on 
the human factor in SIS. In addition, regulators will find many recommendations, particularly 
in the area of governance, to support SIS at the legislative level. This thesis also offers many 
avenues for practitioners to improve the efficiency of SIS, particularly within Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) in charge of producing Cyber Threat Intelligence in 
order to anticipate and prevent cyberrisks. Finally, at the societal level, this work contributes 
to a general equilibrium in perfect competition (Pareto optimum) and thus to achieving the first 
theorem of welfare economics in the field of cybersecurity, i.e. a complete market with no 
transaction cost because each actor as perfect information.
  
  
 
  
 XIX 
Résumé 
Cette thèse présente une contribution de l'économie comportementale à la sécurité des systèmes 
d'information. Elle s’intéresse au mécanisme incitatif permettant de favoriser le partage de 
l’information utile à la cybersécurité (Security Information Sharing – SIS) entre opérateurs 
d’infrastructures critiques, telles que les banques systémiques, les réseaux électriques ou les 
télécommunications. Le SIS est une activité par laquelle ces opérateurs échangent des 
informations relatives aux cybermenaces, par exemple sur les vulnérabilités, les logiciels 
malveillants, les violations de données, etc. Ce partage d'informations est un moyen peu 
coûteux et efficace par lequel les défenseurs de ces infrastructures peuvent renforcer la 
cybersécurité. Toutefois, malgré ces avantages, les (mauvaises) incitations économiques, telles 
que le problème du passager clandestin, réduisent souvent l’utilité pratique du SIS. 
 Cette thèse répond à ce problème avec trois articles publiés. Le premier article présente 
un cadre théorique qui propose une association entre le comportement humain et les résultats 
du SIS. Le deuxième article développe et teste empiriquement cette proposition d'association 
à l'aide des données d'une enquête psychométrique développée avec les participants de la 
Centrale d'enregistrement et d'analyse pour la sûreté de l'information (MELANI). Le SIS est 
mesuré avec une double approche (intensité et fréquence), et des hypothèses sur cinq facteurs 
importants, probablement associés aux résultats du SIS (attitude, réciprocité, coût d'exécution, 
réputation, confiance), sont testées. Dans le troisième article, des recommandations politiques 
sont présentées afin de réduire les coûts d'exécution, qui s'avèrent être associés de manière 
significative et négative au SIS. 
 En conclusion, cette thèse propose de multiples contributions scientifiques et pratiques. 
Ses résultats élargissent la littérature scientifique sur l'économie de la cybersécurité avec trois 
contributions sur le facteur humain dans le SIS. En outre, les régulateurs trouveront de 
nombreuses recommandations, en particulier dans le domaine de la gouvernance, pour soutenir 
le SIS au niveau législatif. Cette thèse offre également de nombreux moyens aux praticiens 
pour améliorer son efficacité, notamment au sein des Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(ISACs) chargés de produire du renseignement sur les cybermenaces (Cyber Threat 
Intelligence) afin d'anticiper et prévenir les cyberrisques. Enfin, sur le plan sociétal, ce travail 
contribue à un équilibre général en concurrence parfaite (optimum de Pareto) et donc à réaliser 
le premier théorème du bien-être dans le domaine de la cybersécurité, c’est-à-dire un marché 
complet sans coût de transaction car chaque acteur dispose d’une information parfaite. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The question to ask when you look at security is not whether this makes us safer, but 
whether it's worth the trade-off.” 
- Bruce Schneier 
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1. The Economics of Information Security 
The economics of information security addresses the economic aspects of the privacy and 
security of information systems. In their seminal article The Economics of Information Security 
(Anderson & Moore, 2006), published in Science Magazine, Anderson and Moore explain that 
many information security systems fail not so much due to technical reasons but because of 
misaligned incentives. They find that information security is shaped by economic mechanisms, 
such as bad design that stems from divergent interests, information asymmetry, adverse 
selection, network externalities, etc. In fact, many unsolved information security problems can 
be studied through the lens of microeconomic principles. 
For instance, the concept of moral hazard can explain why information systems fail when 
the human agents that defend them do not bear the full costs of failure (Moore, Pym, & 
Ioannidis, 2010). In his article, Why Information Security is Hard (Anderson, 2001), Anderson 
already shows that incentives alignment and economic insights should be integrated into a 
proper secure-by-design approach to security engineering. Other security economics 
publications also explore the role of incentives, for instance, between defenders and attackers 
of information systems (Anderson, Moore, Nagaraja, & Ozment, 2007; Moore, 2008; Moore 
& Clayton, 2009). 
 
Figure 1: An Interdisciplinary and Empirical PhD Thesis 
This figure shows how this PhD thesis expands the scientific literature using a psychometric 
methodology to investigate the incentives for human agents to share security information. 
 
Since those founding publications, the economics of information security - which was 
historically a branch of computer science - has blossomed into multiple areas of research 
Information Systems
(Security)
Microeconomics
(Incentives)
Behavioral Sciences
(Psychometrics)
Behavioral 
Economics
PhD Thesis
Economics of 
Information Security
Human Factor 
in SIS
Human-computer 
interaction
(HCI)
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(Anderson & Moore, 2009). It has become a fast-growing research field contributing to the 
development of a multidisciplinary and holistic approach to information security and 
information assurance. The field substantially expanded with the first edition of the Workshop 
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS)1 held in 2002 in Berkeley, CA. Today, the 
WEIS typically combines expertise from the fields of economics, social science, business, law, 
policy, and information systems. Hence, the field age is generally considered to be about 20 
years old, which still makes it a relatively young discipline according to academic standards. 
This dissertation offers a contribution to this fascinating field by growing information security 
economics out through behavioral economics into psychology. 
 
1.1 The Economics of Security Information Sharing 
Neoclassic economics and information security have in common the production of 
mathematical models (often based on game theory) that assume human agents are strictly 
rational homo economicus, i.e. the assumption that human agents always take rational decisions. 
 For instance, the Gordon-Loeb model is one of the most well-accepted analytical models 
in the discipline (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). This economic model analyzes the optimal 
investment level in information security. The model takes into account the vulnerability of the 
information to a security breach and the potential loss should such a breach occur. More 
specifically, the model shows that it is generally not interesting to invest for amounts in 
information security higher than 37% of the predicted loss. 
 Example: suppose an estimated data value of 1’000’000 CHF, with an attack probability 
of 15%, and an 80% chance that an attack would be successful. In this case, the potential loss 
is given by the product 1’000’000 CHF × 0.15 × 0.8 = 120’000 CHF. According to Gordon 
and Loeb, the company's investment in security should not exceed 120’000 CHF × 0.37 = 
44’400 CHF.2 
                                               
1 https://econinfosec.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon%E2%80%93Loeb_model (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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Figure 2: The Gordon-Loeb Model: Benefits and Costs of an Investment in Information 
Security. 
This model seeks the optimal level of investment in information security, given decreasing 
incremental returns. Figure courtesy of Gordon, Loeb, Zhou, 2016. 
 
Underinvestment in information security causes significant hazards for information 
systems. Security information sharing (SIS) appears to be a promising way to solve this 
problem, as theoretical models illustrate that security information sharing lower the investment 
cost for any given level of cybersecurity (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2015b). 
 An extended version of the model shows that SIS can lower the optimal investment into 
information security (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2015a) and that SIS is social welfare 
enhancing (Böhme, 2016). Regarding the incentives for voluntary sharing, if each organization 
is allowed to select its level of information security sharing, the only Nash equilibrium is that 
nobody shares: si = sj = 0 (Böhme, 2016). 
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Figure 3: The Economics of Security Information Sharing (SIS) 
This figure shows a graphical solution of the Gordon-Loeb model where security investment 
and security information sharing are strategic complements. Figure courtesy of Rainer 
Böhme, ACM WISCS (CCS 2016). Source: https://sites.google.com/site/wiscs2016/ 
 
The core of the Gordon-Loeb model states that in case of no market interaction, organizations 
minimize the sum of fixed costs of security expected losses from residual insecurity, as 
presented by Böhme at the 3rd ACM Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative 
Security (WISCS 2016):3 
 
P breach probability function (ℝ#)% 	→ 	 [0, 1] 
x* optimal security investment 
Choice variable  
                                               
3 WISCS 2016 was held in conjunction with the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communication 
Security (CCS 2016). Two other WISCS took place at CCS 2014 and CCS 2015. The workshop proceedings 
offer numerous relevant and seminal insights on the economics of SIS: 
https://sites.google.com/site/wiscs2014 (retrieved on 11.03.19) 
https://sites.google.com/site/wiscs2015 (retrieved on 11.03.19) 
https://sites.google.com/site/wiscs2016 (retrieved on 11.03.19) 
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x 
Security investment [€] » technology level in Gal-Or 
& Ghose, 2005. 
³ 0 
s Security information sharing Î [0, 1] 
Parameters  
L loss given breach [€] > 0 
 
1.2 Homo Economicus vs. Homo Reciprocans in Information Security 
In 2002, Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for “having integrated insights 
from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment 
and decision-making under uncertainty” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Similarly, the 
economics of information security research has injected the effects of psychological, cognitive, 
emotional, cultural and social factors into computer science research (Odlyzko, 2003). If 
computers can be considered rational, the human agents programming and using them are 
usually not. As a result, human agents often remain the weakest link of the cybersecurity chain 
(Moore & Anderson, 2011). 
Behavioral economics for information security investigates human agents and 
organizations design in decision making. This approach encompasses models from the 
traditional rational homo economicus concept, as well as more recent model that emphasizes 
human cooperation. The homo reciprocans concept stands in contrast to the idea of homo 
economicus, which states the opposite theory: Human beings are exclusively motivated by self-
interest (Gintis, 2000). As a theory on human conduct, it is in contrast to the concepts of 
behavioral economics that examines cognitive biases and other irrationalities. Behavioral 
economics and economic psychology emphasize that human agents make many mistakes while 
using computers and processing information (Anderson & Moore, 2009). 
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1.3 Security Information Sharing Definition 
The homo reciprocans concept states that human agents interact with a propensity to cooperate 
if provided with the right incentives (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Human agents will compromise 
in order to achieve a balance between what is best for them and what is best for the environment 
they are a part of. This dissertation uses concepts of behavioral economics – such as the homo 
reciprocans – in order to understand the incentives mechanism that enable cooperation in the 
context of SIS. 
SIS is an activity consisting in sharing cybersecurity-relevant information between 
cybersecurity stakeholders. Human agents typically exchange information on vulnerabilities, 
phishing, malware, and data breaches, as well as threat intelligence, best practices, early 
warnings, and expert advice and insight (Luiijf & Klaver, 2015).  
Cyber-risk management can largely be reduced to a race for information between attackers 
and defenders of information systems (Laube & Böhme, 2017). In his PhD dissertation, Laube 
describes how defenders can gain advantage in this race by sharing security information with 
each other in order to reduce the information asymmetry. Unfortunately, defenders often share 
less information than is socially desirable, as their decisions are guided by selfish reasons and 
(misaligned) incentives. However, SIS generally operates under Metcalfe’s law, i.e. the effect 
of a SIS network is proportional to the square of the number of users of the system (n2). 
Several game-theoretic models investigate the benefits of SIS for individual agents 
(Gordon et al., 2015b; Hausken, 2015), as well as mandatory SIS for authorities (Laube & 
Böhme, 2015). For a firm, SIS is positively associated with its market value (Gordon, Loeb, & 
Sohail, 2010). For an individual agent, the optimal level of cybersecurity can be attained at a 
low cost with SIS (Gordon, Loeb, & Lucyshyn, 2003). SIS has also the ability to reduce the 
uncertainty associated with cyber-risks and to reduce the average time needed to detect a cyber-
attack. In principle, SIS could increase the general level of cybersecurity and total welfare (Gal-
Or & Ghose, 2005). 
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SIS is especially relevant in the context of zero-day4 vulnerability detection (Hausken, 
2007). The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) is a process used by the U.S. federal 
government to determine on a case-by-case basis how it should treat zero-day computer 
security vulnerabilities; whether to disclose them to the public to help improve general 
computer security, or to keep them secret for offensive use against the government's 
adversaries.5 This example shows the power related to SIS, a key activity to mitigate the impact 
of zero-day attacks by reducing the time for vulnerability detection. 
 
1.4 Security Information Sharing Best Practice: The RUAG Case 
In September 2014, an advanced persistent threat 6  (APT) started against the strategic 
government-owned Swiss aerospace and defense group RUAG, a critical infrastructure 
member of MELANI. The cyberattack was motivated by economic espionage and most 
probably state-sponsored, even though the perpetrators of the attack were never formally 
identified. In January 2016, the Swiss intelligence services responded following an information 
received through SIS with the German intelligence services in December 2015.7 
                                               
4 A zero-day vulnerability is a computer-software vulnerability that is unknown to those who would be 
interested in mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is detected and patched the attackers can exploit it to adversely 
affect the defender. “Day Zero” is the day on which the interested party learns of the vulnerability.  
5 https://www.wired.com/story/vulnerability-equity-process-charter-transparency-concerns/ (retrieved on 
15.12.2018) 
6 An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a stealthy computer network attack (often nation-state sponsored) in 
which the attacker remains undetected for a long period of time. APTs are typically hard to attribute and are 
motivated by economic or political interests. 
7 https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/ruag_swiss-close-investigation-into-cyber-attack-on-defence-
firm/44352550 (retrieved on 15.12.2018) 
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Figure 4: Chronology of the Advanced Persistent Threat against RUAG 
This figure shows that the cyberattack against RUAG remained undetected for over one year 
and was finally discovered in December 2015 following security information sharing between 
the Swiss and the German intelligence communities. Figure courtesy of: MELANI / 
GovCERT. 
 
 This example shows that SIS is particularly useful against APTs, i.e. stealthy network 
attacks in which the attacker remains undetected on average for 200 days.8 Traditional security 
technology is typically ineffective in detecting APTs because there are millions of malware 
variations, increasing the information asymmetry between the attacker and the defender. In the 
RUAG case, the attackers have been using malware from the Turla family, which has been in 
the wild for several years. The attack has not been discovered through classical network 
forensics, but thanks to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) exchange, i.e. intelligence based on 
various sources such as open source intelligence (OSINT), social media intelligence 
(SOCMINT), or human intelligence (HUMINT). Thus, SIS was an effective and low-cost way 
to reduce that asymmetry and to discover that the attacker has gained unauthorized access to 
the network of both the Swiss Confederation administration and the German government 
information systems.9 
                                               
8 https://www.swisscom.ch/en/business/enterprise/themen/security/advanced-persistent-threats.html (retrieved 
on 15.12.18) 
9 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43248201 (retrieved on 15.12.18) 
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 The open-source community have also recognized the importance and usefulness of SIS. 
For instance, open-source threat intelligence platforms, such as the Malware Information 
Sharing Platform (MISP) 10  project, develop utilities, tools, and documentation for more 
effective threat intelligence by sharing indicators of compromise, i.e. an artifact observed on a 
network or operating system (OS) that indicates a computer intrusion (Jacquet, 2017). 
 In conclusion, the RUAG case shows that one of the most effective countermeasures from 
a defender’s perspective is the sharing of information about such attacks with other 
organizations, also crossing national borders. If this is done by any affected party, the price for 
the attacker raises, as he risks being detected in every network he attacked in different countries. 
This forces him to either prioritize his targets more, or to use different malware programs. This 
is precisely what happened in the RUAG case: it was detected based upon mutual sharing of 
information.11 
 
2. Related Work and Problem Statement 
Our networked and interdependent environment generates high externalities, which plays a 
significant role in the underinvestment in cybersecurity (Gordon et al., 2015a). Investment in 
cybersecurity is unlikely to reach its theoretical optimum, because negative externalities exist 
and cannot be completely internalized by the agent. As a result, a Nash-stable yet inefficient 
equilibrium emerges in which each cybersecurity agent attempts to free ride on the investments 
of others, producing a suboptimal global level of cybersecurity in the economy. 
 Underinvestment in cybersecurity has negative consequences on the stock market and on 
the economy as a whole (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003). Although such free-riders 
are pervasive, especially in privately owned critical infrastructures, hence presenting 
significant risks to the national economy, the situation is exacerbated when national security is 
also taken into account (Gordon et al., 2015a). This free-rider problem prevents the full 
potential of SIS from being realized (ENISA, 2010; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005), such that SIS is 
likely to remain at a sub-optimal level unless agents are provided with appropriate incentives 
(Aviram & Tor, 2003). 
                                               
10 https://github.com/MISP/MISP (retrieved 03.03.19) 
11 Source: GovCERT.ch, Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG, May 2016. 
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2.1 Mandatory Security Information Sharing 
Incentives can be provided either positively, by increasing the economic and social benefits 
gained when agents share security information, or negatively, by punishing agents that fail to 
share. Despite regulation that has been introduced both in the private and the public sector, 
imposing legal requirements to share security information, this did not seem to produce the 
desired effect of increasing SIS.  
 Reviews conducted in 2015 concluded that such regulatory attempts have been rather 
unsuccessful (ENISA, 2015), such that despite the introduction of several bills in the USA and 
in the EU,12 actual SIS remains at low levels (Gordon et al., 2015b). When forced to share 
security information, organizations can even choose to share irrelevant or incomplete 
information, especially with competitors (Moore, 2010; Moran & Moore, 2010). This 
regulatory failure does not seem to be country specific, as regulatory attempts in other countries 
have been rather unsuccessful as well (Weiss, 2015). 
  
                                               
12 For example, the USA created the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information-Sharing 
Act (CISA). In December 2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on 
cybersecurity, adopting the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) aims to harmonize and unify existing EU privacy breach reporting obligations. 
Like other union breach notification laws, both the GDPR and the NIS Directive impose fines to ensure 
compliance (Laube & Böhme, 2017). 
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Table 1: Literature Review on Security Information Sharing Regulations 
This table summarizes the key characteristics of selected EU and US notification laws. It 
indicates that most disclosure regimes stipulate breach information sharing, which leads to 
disclosure costs for affected firms. Source: Laube, 2017 
 
2.2 Research Gap in Voluntary Security Information Sharing 
By contrast, although recent contributions stress the need to study the theoretical mechanisms 
of how, if at all, positive encouragement could increase SIS, such research is prominently 
absent in the literature to the best of our knowledge. Previous research has identified the study 
of how incentives are linked to SIS as a promising research gap (Hämmerli, Raaum, & 
Franceschetti, 2013) and has expressed the need to develop and test theories linking incentives 
with SIS outcomes. This dissertation elaborates a theoretical understanding of which incentives 
would make agents voluntarily share SIS, as well as an understanding of the mechanisms by 
which they work (ENISA, 2010; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon et al., 2003; Harrison & White, 
2012). 
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Table 2: Systematic Literature Review on Voluntary Security Information Sharing 
This table summarizes key reviewed publication on voluntary SIS. Source: Laube & Böhme, 
2017 
 
 All in all, the literature suggests that human behavior may be significantly associated with 
the extent to which SIS occurs (if at all). It is therefore not surprising to see recent work 
emphasizing that the study of human behavior is key to the understanding of SIS (Böhme, 
2016). More specifically, this work predicts that SIS can only be imperfectly understood unless 
the human motivation for (not) participating in SIS is studied (Harrison and White, 2012; 
Laube and Böhme, 2016; Vakilinia et al., 2017). 
 However, few contributions have addressed this research gap to date. Since Laube and 
Böhme, 2017 have provided an excellent account of the SIS literature, we refrain from 
replicating this account here. We rather point to the fact that this account shows that very few 
Research 
Gap 
 
Thesis 
Contribution 
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empirical studies on non-public SIS exist. These few studies focus on analyzing incident counts 
and aggregate data, but they do not study human behavior at the individual level of analysis 
(see Laube and Böhme, 2017: 28 for a tabulated overview). 
 My research intends to close this gap by proposing how and why human behavior and SIS 
may be associated, and by providing an empirical test of this association. As cybersecurity 
problems are unlikely to be resolved by information systems theory alone, I adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach as recommended by Anderson and Moore (2006). Recently, 
interdisciplinary studies were productive in showing the extent to which human behavior is 
associated with knowledge sharing (Yan et al., 2016; Safa and von Solms, 2016). 
Human agents can benefit from receiving information from others but still refuse to share 
such information, thus free riding on the information value provided by others. As other agents 
anticipate this behavior, the overall level of sharing would be low and investment cost could 
not attain its efficient optimum. This research therefore proposes that agents will not engage in 
SIS unless they are incentivized appropriately. Both this theoretical link between incentives 
and SIS, as well as their conceptualization and empirical test, has not been dealt with in the 
existing literature.  
 
2.3 Research Questions 
This thesis addresses this research gap by providing a theoretical framework that links 
incentives to SIS. Before, very little was known about the particular incentives that actually 
increase voluntary SIS, or about the mechanisms by which they take effect. To the best of our 
knowledge, no theory linking incentives to SIS has yet been produced or tested. Whereas the 
collective benefits of SIS have been contrasted with the low levels of sharing actually observed, 
very little work has been done to identify and test the types of incentive that could actually 
increase the level of sharing. Therefore, this research closes this gap by answering one main 
research question which entails three consecutive sub-questions answered in three distinct parts: 
Which incentives and barriers are likely to influence the SIS activity? 
I. How to measure the SIS activity and its predictors? 
II. What are the empirical effects of those identified predictors on SIS? 
III. What are the preferred governance models for the SIS activity? 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 28 
2.4 Theoretical Foundations 
The underlying assumptions of this thesis are anchored in the position that the technical aspects 
of computer science alone are not sufficient to solve all cybersecurity problems. Therefore, 
methodologies and concepts from other disciplines are necessary (Anderson & Moore, 2009). 
Arguments have been presented in the psychology and sociology literature on the role of 
positive incentives in persuading agents that they can improve their economic situation by 
behaving in a particular way (Anderson & Moore, 2009). Extended research in behavioral 
economics has demonstrated that by using rewards and sanctions, we can channel human 
behavior towards particular options (Bauer & van Eeten, 2009). In these models, positive 
incentives offer the agent a Pareto-superior13 state vis-a-vis the current state, at the cost of 
behavioral compliance.  
 When applied to SIS, these models suggest that agents will share more information if they 
expect that the particular incentives provided will enable them to reduce their individual 
investment in cybersecurity (Anderson et al., 2007; Davidson, Fenn, & Cid, 2016). Finally, 
research on meta-governance suggests that governments must encourage networks to achieve 
their goal of increasing SIS (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009). Taken together, this literature 
suggests that human volition14 is changed as a result of expected costs and benefits associated 
with particular actions. 
 
2.5 Research Methodology 
This section summarizes the different tools and methods used to answer our three research 
questions. The detailed methodology can be found separately in each part of the thesis. 
 First, I build a multidisciplinary theoretical framework that links incentives, selected from 
published scientific literature, to SIS. On this basis, I conceptualize a model linking the 
identified incentives to SIS. I do not pre-suppose any particular institutional or organizational 
design; incentives could be provided by governments, through contractual arrangements 
                                               
13 Pareto optimality is a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make 
any human agent better off without making at least one human agent worse off. 
14 Volition is the cognitive process by which a human agent decides on a particular course of action. 
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between participants, or by public-private partnerships. In particular, for my overarching 
theoretical mechanism, I design a two-step mechanism by which, in a first step, incentives 
change agents’ expectations. In a second phase, these changed expectations then trigger 
individual actions that result in SIS. 
 Second, on the basis of this theoretical framework, I construct and empirically test my 
system model. Section 2.8 details why the model was adapted from two-step to one-step during 
the operationalization process. This thesis presents – to the best of my knowledge – the first 
empirical analysis of the effect of each incentive on SIS, and also possible moderation and 
mediation effects between incentives. To attain this goal, I operationalize and empirically test 
my framework with an exclusive dataset collected together with the Swiss Reporting and 
Analysis Centre for Information Security (MELANI) which operates an ISAC (MELANI-
Net)15. The online survey was sent to the 424 participants of that closed SIS user group. The 
methods to design the questionnaire are interdisciplinary as they are at the intersection of 
economics (econometrics), psychology (psychometrics) and information assurance. 
 Based on that primary data, the SIS activity is regressed on previously identified 
motivational factors. Methods used for validating and/or falsifying hypotheses are related to 
econometrics/psychometrics, and more precisely on a tobit model (describing the relationship 
between a non-negative dependent variable and an independent variable) and a probit model, 
i.e. a regression where the dependent variable can take only two values. All the research was 
conducted at a micro-level of analysis, i.e. investigated under a microeconomic and/or 
psychological perspective related to preferences, resource allocation, incentives, motivations 
and human behavior. 
 Third, I present descriptive statistics illustrating an application of our framework in the 
context of critical infrastructure protection. Using my exclusive field-data, I investigate 
correlations between three governance models’ preferences and institutional rules. Finally, I 
extend my pre-analysis to four other control variables in order to complement the preferences 
analysis. 
 
                                               
15 https://melani-net.ssl.admin.ch (retrieved 10.03.2019) 
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2.6 Fundamental Choice of Research Method 
In principle, SIS can be fundamentally analyzed by looking at data or humans (Dillman et al., 
2014; Nunnally and Bernstein, 2017). Previous researches have empirically investigated SIS 
by using (meta)data (Laube & Böhme, 2017) or by analyzing data from Security Information 
and Event Management (SIEM) software, that combine Security Event Management (SEM) 
and Security Information Management (SIM), i.e. the collection of data such as log files into a 
central repository for trend analysis. 
 A pre-analysis of the MELANI-Net log file and MELANI internal statistics confirmed that 
about half of the population has not shared any information during the past ten years. This 
confirms the presence of a free-rider problem, illustrated in a case study at the end of Part I. 
However, this data was unfit for empirical analysis, since it was collected for an internal 
satisfactory survey, and not empirical testing of hypothesis specifically investigating human 
behavior in SIS. 
 Therefore, I opted for a psychometric approach, which is a well-established method to 
measure, study and analyze human behavior. Psychometrics has existed as a research method 
since at least 1936 when Thurstone founded the American Psychometric Society, and it is a 
relevant and rigorous method for the analysis of human behavior (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 2017).  
 From the questionnaire design through the estimation of the models, I followed established 
standards of good practice in psychometric methodology and empirical analysis (Dillman et 
al., 2014; Nunnally and Bernstein, 2017). At least two of the publications I cite and adapt scales 
from (Yan et al., 2016; Safa and von Solms, 2016) use psychometric methods in the IS domain 
to make contributions to both information systems research and to the interaction of technical 
systems and human behavior. Also, the models I used (ordered logistic regression, Tobit 
regression) are well-established in econometric analysis, see Greene (2017). 
 
2.7 Choices About the Study of Human Behavior 
Fundamentally, there are two main ways to study human behavior: (1) ethnographics and (2) 
psychometrics. An ethnographic study would imply real-time human interaction observation, 
for instance with a “spyware” recording human behavior on an ISAC. This approach is hard to 
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implement but would allow SIS observation over time and the development of longitudinal 
studies. 
 My approach is not an ethnographic one, in that I would observe individuals in the wild as 
they socially interact. Rather, I collected survey data by which these individuals report about 
the nature and results of their social interactions. That is an inherent limitation of psychometric 
research, nevertheless, I believe the approach is acceptable since it follows the established 
standards of good practice in this field (Nunnally and Bernstein, 2017). 
 However, this approach was not feasible in my context for many technical and institutional 
barriers. Therefore, I have opted for the second approach, psychometrics, where humans self-
report their behavior and experience with SIS. This approach offers numerous advantages in 
my sensitive context (MELANI and the Swiss Intelligence Community work closely together 
with) where respondent wish to remain anonymous. Hence, on ground of research ethics an 
ethnographic approach is not feasible.  
 
2.8 Psychometric Operationalization 
The three parts in this dissertation are linked psychometrically in the following order: Part I 
defines constructs on a theoretical ground and establishes theoretical measurement level, that 
Part II intends to test. However, in the course of this dissertation, important adaptation and 
modification to the measurement model as specified in Part I are made such that Part II presents 
a more advanced model. When Part I was presented and published in the post-proceedings of 
CRITIS’16 I have featured a two-step estimation procedure by which incentives would proceed 
expectations and behavior. 
 However, as my research progressed, I found that this model could be simplified to a more 
fundamental association between human behavior and SIS. This implied psychometric 
operationalization of the constructs directly as regards human behavior without going through 
intervening or mediating constructs. Hence, the two-step estimation theoretically proposed in 
Part I was adapted to a linear model that analyses the association between human behavior and 
SIS. 
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2.9 Empirical Procedures 
In principle, when working the psychometric constructs, models can be estimated either by 
econometric methods or by applying Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 2017). In this research, I opted for an econometric approach and this for the 
following reasons: SEM is a useful analytical tool, however in my case there are some 
limitations that make econometric estimation better. 
 First, SEM is appropriate when the researcher studies latent constructs whose theoretical 
content cannot or only imperfectly be observed in empirical reality, such that the measured 
data are collected with significant and structural measurement error. However, I do not theorize 
about latent constructs nor do I attempt to study any such construct. My study focuses on 
specific human behavior that can be directly reported by respondents. Particularly, since my 
questionnaire records self-reported measures, no external intervention from the side of the 
researcher is required for data collection, which limits the potential impact of measurement 
error. 
 Further, SEM should be preferred over econometric models if the relationship between the 
constructs is so complex that it cannot be adequately captured by either moderation, mediation, 
two-stage least square (2SLS), or three-stage least square (3SLS) analysis (Zellner & Theil, 
1962). However, my approach attempts to identify a rather straightforward association between 
human behavior and SIS. This theoretical development does not specify complex relationships 
between the constructs I measure. 
Finally, my theoretical development specifies interaction effects. The estimation of 
interaction effects is cumbersome in an SEM model. A few years ago, simpler methods to do 
this emerged (more technical documentation is available on request), but I do not believe these 
novel developments are established to an extent that they could be termed safe practice. 
Additionally, while these methods are easier to apply than their predecessors, they are still 
more cumbersome than calculating interaction effects in regression analyses. 
 
2.10 Explanation of the Particular Constructs 
As in the proceeding section, Part II presents more advanced empirical model then Part I, both 
in term of theoretical and their operationalization. In Part I, I had adopted psychometric scales 
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from the literature but labeled these scales differently. This approach was problematic, because 
it let to inconsistencies between the construct as it was defined by the original authors and my 
subjective interpretation of those constructs. 
 Therefore, in Part II, I returned to the original scales as they were published. These 
psychometric scales are documented in the appendix to Part II. The constructs are chosen in 
both prior behavioral research, behavioral economics and social psychology. These measure 
important aspects of human behavior, which are particularly relevant in the context of SIS. 
 
2.11 Research Context 
This research uses the Swiss ISAC MELANI-Net both for illustration, data collection and 
policy recommendations. I do not study public knowledge sharing or Q&A forums like, e.g., 
Yan et al. (2016) do. I study an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), and there is 
only one ISAC in Switzerland. An ISAC is an organization that brings together – in person, by 
face-to-face meetings – specialist managers that exchange information that is relevant for 
cybersecurity. See ENISA (2017) for a detailed description and historical background of 
different ISACs in European countries and the USA.  
MELANI-Net is the national Swiss information security analysis center (ISAC). It is 
comparable to other national-level ISACs where information about cyberthreats and incidents 
relevant for the national economy, government institutions and critical infrastructures is shared 
by direct (social) interaction. Such ISACs exist in most developed countries. However, in 
contrast to many other countries, membership in MELANI-Net is voluntary. Within this ISAC, 
I have studied the closed user group, i.e. those senior management professionals who exchange 
highly sensitive data about security incidents, threats, and breaches. In the revised Part I have 
provided more background explanation regarding MELANI-Net, including the highly detailed 
report of Dunn Cavelty (2014: 39-54). 
Any information exchange via MELANI-Net is restricted to the 424 members of the closed 
user group. Each and every member of this group must undergo government-led confirmation 
of their ID and personality before they are allowed access to the ISAC (hence, membership in 
MELANI-Net, unlike in Q&A forums, is restricted and subject to high-level legitimization 
procedures). There is no public forum, discussion, or dissemination.  
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The operative problem of my study is to capture human behavior as it unfolds. An 
ethnographic approach was impossible since respondents wished to remain anonymous, such 
that ID’ing individuals and observing their interaction in real time was not feasible. I therefore 
resorted to an alternative approach. Within MELANI-Net, the very social exchange that 
constitutes SIS is often triggered by an initial message that an individual concerned with a 
cyberthreat posts on an internal message board. The focal individual can decide with whom 
(among the other members) this information is shared. 
 
3. Thesis Structure and Outline  
This cumulative thesis is divided into three parts, based on two double-blind peer-reviewed 
articles published in conference proceedings and one double-blind peer-reviewed publication 
revised and resubmitted in the Journal of Cybersecurity. 16  The three parts can be read 
independently as standalone manuscripts. However, the weaknesses of this format are that it 
can lead to content redundancies and some small terminology differences across the different 
parts. 
The three articles presented are developed in a chronological symbiosis order from the 
beginning of the PhD thesis. The first part establishes a novel theoretical framework linking 
incentives and SIS. A first version of the theoretical model is presented, and five SIS indicators 
are identified in order to analyze the SIS incentive mechanism. The second part provides 
empirical analyses by testing the hypotheses developed in Part I. The third part provides policy 
recommendations based on the same exclusive dataset as in Part II. 
 
  
                                               
16 https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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3.1 Part I: Theoretical Framework 
The following conference paper was presented in October 2016 at the 11th Critical Information 
Infrastructure Security17 (CRITIS 2016), held in Paris, France: 
• Mermoud, A., Keupp, M. M., Ghernaouti, S., & Percia David, D. (2016). Using 
Incentives to Foster Security Information Sharing and Cooperation: A General Theory 
and Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection. In Lectures Notes in Computer 
Science (pp. 150-162). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71368-
7_13 
This paper was accepted as full paper among 22 other full papers and 8 short papers reviewed 
and selected from a total of 58 submissions. A revised version of the post-conference 
proceedings paper appears in Part I of this thesis. 
 
3.2 Part II: Empirical Analysis 
The following conference paper was presented in June 2018 at the 17th annual Workshop on 
the Economics of Information Security18 (WEIS 18), held in Innsbruck, Austria: 
• Mermoud, A., Keupp, M. M., Huguenin, K., Palmié, M., & Percia David, D. (2018). 
Incentives for Human Agents to Share Security Information: A Model and an 
Empirical Test. In Proceedings of the 17th Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS), Innsbruck, Austria. 
https://weis2018.econinfosec.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2018/05/WEIS_2018_paper_7.pdf 
This paper was accepted as full paper among 22 other full paper reviewed and selected from a 
total of 57 submission. This conference paper has been revised and resubmitted to the Journal 
of Cybersecurity on the 28th of February 2019 and appears in Part II of this thesis, under the 
following title: To Share or not to Share: A Behavioral Perspective on Human Participation 
in Security Information Sharing. 
                                               
17 http://critis2016.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
18 https://weis2018.econinfosec.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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3.3 Part III: Policy Recommendations 
The following conference paper was presented in September 2018 at the 13th International 
Conference on Critical Information Infrastructure Security19 (CRITIS 2018), held in Kaunas, 
Lithuania: 
• Mermoud, A., Keupp, M. M., Percia David, D. (2019). Governance Models 
Preferences for Security Information Sharing: An Institutional Economics Perspective 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection. In Lectures Notes in Computer Science (pp. 179-
190). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05849-4_14 
This paper was accepted as full paper among 16 other full papers and 3 short papers reviewed 
and selected from a total of 61 submissions. A revised version of the post-conference 
proceedings paper appears in Part III of this thesis. 
 
4. Other Scientific Contributions 
4.1 Conference Paper: CRITIS 2016 
The following conference paper was presented in October 2016 at the 11th International 
Conference on Critical Information Infrastructure Security20 (CRITIS 2016), held in Paris, 
France: 
• Percia David, D., Keupp, M. M., Ghernaouti, S., & Mermoud, A. (2016). Cyber 
Security Investment in the Context of Disruptive Technologies: Extension of the 
Gordon-Loeb Model and Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection. In 
International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (pp. 296-
301). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71368-7_25 
This paper was accepted as short paper among 22 other full papers and 8 short papers reviewed 
and selected from a total of 58 submissions. 
 
                                               
19 http://www.lei.lt/critis2018 (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
20 http://critis2016.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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4.2 Journal Article: Computers in Human Behavior 
The following journal article was accepted with major revisions in Computers in Human 
Behavior21 on the 3rd of January 2019: 
• Percia David, D., Keupp, M. M., Mermoud, A. (2019). Opportunism is Not Enough: 
The Influence of Agent Behavior on the Perceived Performance of Security 
Information Sharing. Computers in Human Behavior. 
This manuscript extends the findings in this dissertation by focusing on the perceived 
performance of SIS, arguing that the extent to which a human agent engages in SIS is a function 
of their individual performance expectation, i.e., of the net benefit they expect as a result of 
engaging in SIS. Combining theory with opportunistic action and altruistic punishment, we 
provide empirical analysis predictors of the perceived performance of SIS. Our results suggest 
that the frequency of sharing transactions, the perceived utility of resource allocation, 
reciprocity expectations, and trust have a significant effect on the formation of the perceived 
performance of SIS. These findings point to several opportunities to motivate human agents to 
show cooperative behavior. 
 
4.3 Bachelor Thesis Supervision 
During my time as PhD student I was lucky enough to supervise a bachelor thesis which 
received the 2018 award “Prix à l’innovation du domaine économie et services de la HES-SO”: 
• Cuche, K., Madinier, H., Mermoud, A. (2018). Intelligence économique et politique : 
besoins et pratiques dans les principaux partis politiques suisses (bachelor 
dissertation). https://doc.rero.ch/record/323603?ln=fr 
This work received some media coverage, for instance in the Swiss daily reference newspaper 
Le Temps: 
• Mermoud, A. & Cuche, K. (2017). Le fédéralisme, meilleur antidote contre les 
manipulations politiques, in Le Temps (04.09.2017).22 
                                               
21 https://www.journals.elsevier.com/computers-in-human-behavior (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
22 https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/federalisme-meilleur-antidote-contre-manipulations-politiques (retrieved 
11.01.2019) 
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5. Research Disseminations 
This section lists research disseminations activities – in different languages and through 
different channels – provided to practitioners, experts, and students: 
5.1 Lecturer at ETH Zurich 
During the Autumn Semester 2018, I had the chance to become lecturer of the course 853-
0102-00L Military Business Administration II - Case Examples23 at the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology (ETH Zurich). This gave me the opportunity to transfer my research results to 
the students in German. The program of the course is organized into 14 units of 90 minutes 
each. The units combine the elements of lecture (where analytical concepts are taught) and 
application (where these concepts as applied). The program focuses on an analysis of hybrid 
warfare against Switzerland. Three main topics are highlighted: cyber defense, security of 
critical infrastructures, and security of supply. 
 
5.2 Conference on Economic Warfare at ETH Zurich 
In 2016, I had the opportunity to organize and coordinate the autumn conference of the Military 
Academy at ETH Zurich dedicated to the challenges and strategies of modern economic 
warfare. On the 10th of September 2016, around 200 guests from politics, the military, business 
and science attended the event. The conference leader, PD Dr. Marcus M. Keupp and four 
renowned experts explored the hybrid threat potential of modern economic warfare and 
developed defense strategies. I was also in charge of the overall coordination and edition of the 
conference proceedings: 
• Keupp, M.M., Mermoud, A. (Gesamtredaktion). (2016). Der moderne 
Wirtschaftskrieg - Herausforderungen und Strategien. Schriftenreihe MILAK-
Herbsttagung vom 10.09.2016. ISBN: 978-3-9524718-0-7. 
https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/organisation/kdo-ausb/hka/milak.detail.news.html/vtg-
internet/verwaltung/2016/16-09/16-09-10-milak.html 
                                               
23http://www.vorlesungsverzeichnis.ethz.ch/Vorlesungsverzeichnis/lerneinheit.view?lerneinheitId=124153&sem
kez=2018W&ansicht=KATALOGDATEN&lang=en (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 39 
5.3 Massive Open Online Course (MOOC): The Economics of Cybersecurity 
At the beginning of the year 2015, while writing my PhD thesis proposal, I had the opportunity 
to take the DelftX - EconSec101x MOOC24 on the Economics of Cybersecurity. This online 
course was a great introduction to the topic and offered me the opportunity to interact 
informally  through an internal forum  with my research community at an early stage of my 
research. As the final part of this course, I had to write a short reflection essay on the economics 
of security information sharing which received several relevant feedbacks. 
 
5.4 Invited Talks 
During my period as a PhD candidate, I had the chance to give a few invited talks, for instance: 
• On the 17th of February 2016, in French and German, for the Höhere Stabsoffiziere 
(HSO) Seminar, gathering all senior staff officers of the Swiss Armed Forces (in the 
rank of brigadier, major general or lieutenant general), held in Bern, Switzerland. 
• On the 24th of May 2016, in French, for The Swiss Association for Market Research, 
Competitive Intelligence and Strategic Planning (SMCS),25 held in Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
• On the 6th of December 2016, in French, for the Association suisse de la sécurité de 
l’information (CLUSIS)26 held in Geneva, Switzerland. 
• On the 13th of December 2016, in French, for the 30th De Nouvelles Architectures 
pour les Communications (DNAC 2016)27 held at Télécom ParisTech, in Paris. 
 
  
                                               
24 https://www.edx.org/course/cyber-security-economics-delftx-secon101x-0 (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
25 https://swissintell.ch (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
26 https://clusis.ch (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
27 https://dnac2016.dnac.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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5.5 Professional and Trade Magazines, Newspapers and Book Chapters 
During my time as a PhD candidate, I had the opportunity to coordinate (as associate editor) a 
special edition of the Revue Militaire Suisse28 (RMS+ N°6 / 2018) dedicated to cybersecurity 
and threat intelligence. I also authored several vulgarized articles for information professionals 
and security experts: 
• Mermoud, A. (2015). Comment la Suisse a gagné le Cyber Challenge 2015, in Le 
Temps (11.05.2015). 
• Mermoud, A. & Percia David, D. (2016). La LRens, pour réduire le vide stratégique 
numérique, in Le Temps (21.09.2016). 
• Mermoud, A., & Percia David, D. (2016). L’intelligence économique : Du renseignement 
militaire au renseignement privé, in Revue Militaire Suisse (RMS+) N°4. 
• Percia David, D. & Mermoud, A.  (2016). L’attractivité du service militaire : garantie 
d’un système sécuritaire efficace, in Revue Militaire Suisse (RMS+) N°6. 
• Keupp M.M., Mermoud, A., & Percia David, D. (2017). Pour une approche 
économique de la cybersécurité, in Military Power Revue N°1. 
• Keupp M.M., Mermoud, A., & Percia David, D. (2018). Teile und herrsche: 
Cybersicherheit durch Informationsaustausch, in Allgemeine Schweizerische 
Militärzeitschrift (ASMZ) N° 7. 
• Keupp M.M., Percia David, D. & Mermoud, A. (2018). Teile und herrsche: 
Cybersicherheit durch Fusionszentren, in Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift 
(ASMZ) N°13. 
• Mermoud, A., & Percia David, D. (2018). La souveraineté du renseignement : un 
besoin stratégique grandissant, in Revue Militaire Suisse (RMS+) N°6. 
• Mermoud, A., & Percia David, D. (2018). Produire du renseignement grâce au 
partage d’information, in Revue Militaire Suisse (RMS+) N°6. 
• Percia David, D. & Mermoud, A. (2018). Les fusion centers: le renseignement sous 
stéroïdes ?, in Revue Militaire Suisse (RMS+) N°6. 
• Mermoud, A., Keupp, M. M. (2019). Using Incentives to Foster Security Information Sharing 
and Cooperation: A General Theory and Empirical Application to Critical Infrastructure 
Defense. Springer, Cham. 
                                               
28 The complete collection of the RMS archives is available online at e-periodica.ch via a project led by ETH 
Zurich. 
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5.6 Consulting Services 
During my time as a PhD candidate, I was lucky enough to offer some consulting services 
based on my research for the private sector and policy makers: 
• Credit Suisse AG, Economic Research, Zurich. 
• Canton of Geneva: permanent member of the Geneva Security Council. 
• Canton of Fribourg: advisor to the Business Continuity Plan in Case of Network 
Breakdown. 
• Military Intelligence Service, Swiss Armed Forces. 
 
5.7 Cybersecurity Competitions 
During my time as a PhD candidate, I had the opportunity to participate in two leading 
international cybersecurity competitions: 
• Winner of the 2015 Cyber 9/12 Student Challenge29 as head of team Switzerland, held 
in Geneva, Switzerland. 
• Judge at the 2016 Cyber 9/12 Student Challenge, held in Geneva, Switzerland. 
  
                                               
29 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/resources/cyber-912-student-challenge-resources (retrieved on 29.10.2018) 
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“People often represent the weakest link in the security chain and are chronically 
responsible for the failure of security systems.” 
“Amateurs hack systems, professionals hack people.” 
- Bruce Schneier
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Abstract  
There is a conspicuous lack of investment in cybersecurity. Various measures have been 
proposed to mitigate this. Investment models theoretically demonstrate the potential 
application of security information sharing (SIS) to critical infrastructure protection (CIP). 
However, the free-rider problem remains a major pitfall, preventing the full potential benefits 
of SIS from being realized. We closed an important research gap by providing a theoretical 
framework that links incentives with voluntary SIS. We applied this framework to CIP through 
a case study of the Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security, and we used 
the SIS model to analyze the incentive mechanisms that most effectively support SIS for CIP. 
Our work contributes to an understanding of the free-rider problem that plagues the provision 
of the public good that is cybersecurity and offer clues to its mitigation. 
 
Keywords: cybersecurity economics; cybersecurity efficiency and effectiveness; investments 
and incentives of critical infrastructure protection; free-rider problem; security information 
sharing economics; information assurance.  
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1. Introduction 
Investment in cybersecurity1 remains Pareto sub-optimal due to the presence of externalities 
that cannot be completely internalized by the investor (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 
2015b). As a result, a Nash-stable yet inefficient equilibrium has emerged, in which each 
cybersecurity investor attempts to free ride on the investments of the others, consequently 
producing a Pareto sub-optimal global level of cybersecurity in the economy (Gordon, Loeb, 
Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2015a). Although such free-rider problems are pervasive in the private 
sector and present significant risks to the national economy, the situation is exacerbated when 
national security is also taken into account (Gordon et al., 2015a). Universities, critical 
infrastructure (CI) providers, government, and the armed forces all rely heavily on information 
technology (IT) systems to fulfill their mandates. This makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks, 
which makes the consequences of cybersecurity breaches especially harmful for society as a 
whole (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2015a). Various measures have been proposed to 
mitigate this problem of under-investment, among which the sharing of cybersecurity-relevant 
information appears to be the most viable and relevant, as a way of simultaneously mitigating 
the externalities and increasing individual utility, inter-investor information, and social welfare 
(Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). Furthermore, such sharing can reduce the information asymmetry 
between an attacker and the defender in the case of zero-day vulnerability attacks where the 
defender has little, if any, time to react (Laube & Böhme, 2016). By “sharing of cybersecurity-
relevant information”, we refer to a process by which cybersecurity investors provide each 
other with information about threats, vulnerabilities, and successfully defended cyberattacks. 
For the sake of brevity, we will refer to this as “security information sharing” (SIS). 2 Part I of 
this thesis is organized as follows. In the first and second sections, we develop a theoretical 
framework and present our propositions. In Section 3, we report a case study. In Section 4, we 
discuss the limitations and possible extensions of the model. Our concluding remarks and 
proposals for future work are given in Section 5. 
 
                                               
1 In our study we use the term “cybersecurity” as a synonym for “information security,” referring to the 
protection of information that is transmitted over the Internet or any other computer network. 
2 “security information sharing” SIS can be defined as the mutual exchange of cybersecurity-relevant 
information on vulnerabilities, phishing, malware, and data breaches, as well as threat intelligence, best 
practices, early warnings, and expert advice and insight. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Propositions 
The importance of SIS for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is widely acknowledged by 
academics, policy-makers, and industrial actors, as it can reduce risks, deter attacks, and 
enhance the resilience of the CI (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009). Cybercriminals and hackers 
have a long history of sharing experiences, tools, and vulnerabilities; this has contributed to 
the success of major cyberattacks. The timely introduction of SIS is therefore vital for CIP, 
because attackers sharing techniques erodes the effectiveness of traditional defense tools (de 
Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007). The Gordon-Loeb model theoretically demonstrates the potential 
application of SIS to CIP (Gordon, Loeb, & Lucyshyn, 2003). However, empirical studies have 
shown that a significant free-rider problem exists, preventing the full potential of SIS from 
being realized (ENISA, 2010). Although SIS offers a promising way of reducing the amount 
of total investment needed to establish cybersecurity, extant empirical research shows that both 
the frequency of SIS (i.e., the number of security information sharing transactions between 
investors in a given time interval) and its intensity (i.e., the depth of information shared in each 
transaction, represented by the number of comments related to each incident shared) remain at 
relatively low levels in the absence of any further intervention. In the absence of appropriate 
extra incentives, SIS is likely to be conducted at a sub-optimal level (Aviram & Tor, 2003). 
 
2.1 Regulation Alone Cannot Solve the Free-Rider Problem 
Incentives can be either positive, by increasing the economic and social benefits gained when 
investors share security information, or negative, by punishing investors that fail to share. 
Attempts to introduce negative incentives through regulation have been rather unsuccessful 
(ENISA, 2015). In the USA3 and in the EU,4 despite the introduction of several bills that 
encourage security-information sharing, the actual SIS remains at low levels (Gordon, Loeb, 
Lucyshyn, & Sohail, 2006). These bills were an attempt to impose legal requirements on both 
the private and public sectors when they share information, but to date such regulations do not 
seem to be producing the desired effect of increasing SIS (Hausken, 2007). When forced to 
share SIS, firms might even choose to share irrelevant or incomplete information, especially 
                                               
3 In particular the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
(CISA). 
4 In December 2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on 
cybersecurity, adopting the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. 
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with competitors (Moran & Moore, 2010). This regulatory failure does not seem to be country 
specific because attempts at negative incentivization  by means of regulation, laws, and the 
imposition of punishments  have also been unsuccessful elsewhere (Weiss, 2015). 
 
2.2 Linking Incentives to Voluntary SIS 
We propose an alternative approach to regulation. Security information, once obtained, can be 
either shared at a small marginal cost or kept private and hoarded by the producer. Therefore, 
a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that would cause investors to voluntarily share 
SIS (Harrison & White, 2012) is needed. We propose that both the frequency and intensity of 
SIS will increase if investors are provided with appropriate positive incentives to share 
information (as opposed to being forced or encouraged to share through regulation). We do not 
presuppose any particular institutional or organizational design; incentives could be provided 
by government, through contractual arrangements between participants, or by public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). Although previous research has identified this as a promising approach 
(Hämmerli & Grudzien, 2015), very little is known about the particular incentives (if any) that 
actually increase voluntary SIS, or about the mechanisms by which they work. Past 
contributions have repeatedly stressed the need to develop and test theories linking incentives 
with SIS outcomes (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005) but, to the best of our knowledge, no such theory 
has yet been produced or tested. As a result, the existing literature provides few serious 
discussions on the causal linkages by which incentives could be expected to increase the 
intensity and frequency of SIS. Whereas the collective benefits of SIS have been contrasted 
with the low levels of sharing actually observed, very little work has been done to identify the 
types of incentive that could successfully correct this. To close this gap, we propose a 
theoretical framework that links incentives with voluntary SIS. Our theory identifies the 
incentives that are expected to increase the frequency and intensity of voluntary SIS and 
clarifies the causal mechanisms by which they function. 
 
2.3 A Holistic and Multidisciplinary Approach 
In the psychology and sociology literature, arguments are presented on the role of positive 
incentives in persuading economic actors that they can improve their economic situation by 
behaving in a particular way (Anderson & Moore, 2009). For example, research in behavioral 
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economics demonstrates that using incentives, rewards, and sanctions, can channel human 
behavior towards particular options (Bauer & van Eeten, 2009). More generally, this literature 
identifies human behavior as the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain (Ghernaouti, 2013). 
In these models, positive incentives offer the agent a Pareto-superior state vis-a-vis the current 
state, at the cost of behavioral compliance. When applied to SIS, these models suggest that 
investors will share information only if they expect that the particular incentives provided will 
enable them to reduce their individual investment in cybersecurity (Anderson, Moore, Nagaraja, 
& Ozment, 2007). Therefore, for our overarching theoretical mechanism, we propose that, for 
a first step, incentives “work” by changing investors’ expectations. These changed expectations 
then trigger individual actions that result in SIS. We primarily view both the frequency and 
intensity of SIS as functions of the change in agents’ expectations. It is the change that is the 
phenomenon of interest, rather than the particular incentive that induces it. In practice, a variety 
of incentives could be used to change expectations, and these are likely to be context-specific 
to particular countries, political and economic systems, and cultures. The current study differs 
from previous research in this domain by being grounded in empirical observations from an 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC)5. Our findings constitute an evidence base 
and an important contribution to the new fast-growing field of the “economics of 
cybersecurity”, and they are generalizable to other jurisdictions. Most importantly, our results 
will support the design of the next generation of ISACs, namely Information Sharing and 
Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), 6 in which incentives and voluntary SIS will play a key role 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2016). Fusion centers7 and the emerging threat intelligence 
platform (TPI) technology8  might also benefit from our findings, by providing the right 
incentives to their members to share more real-time threat data. 
 
                                               
5 An ISAC is generally a non-profit organization that provides a platform for SIS, between the government and 
CIs. 
6 Unlike ISACs, ISAOs are not directly tied to CIs and offer a flexible and voluntary approach for SIS. 
7 A fusion center is an information sharing center designed to promote information sharing between different 
agencies. 
8 The TPI technology helps organizations to analyze and aggregate real-time threat data to support defensive 
actions. 
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2.4 A Model Linking Incentives, Behavior, and SIS  
Previous research suggests that four expectations are particularly relevant to the human 
interactions involved in sharing: reciprocity, value, institutional, and reputation (ENISA, 2010). 
We designed a two-stage SIS model. In the first step, incentives are provided to change the 
expectations of the agents. In the second step, these changed expectations trigger actions that 
result in an increase in SIS (Fig.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Design of a SIS Model 
 
In summary, our model describes how incentives change expectations hence modifies the 
behavior of actors in order to improve voluntary SIS. We define frequency by the number of 
shared transactions between participants, and intensity by the depth of SIS in one single 
transaction. We further propose that the relationship between each of these effects and SIS is 
positively influenced by the degree of trust between individual agents. 
 
2.5 Reciprocity Expectation 
The extent to which human agents will engage in voluntary SIS depends on their expectations 
of reciprocity or recompense for the information they share (Xiong & Liu, 2004). For example, 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks often confront the problem of free-riders (so-called “leechers”), 
because most participants would prefer to avoid seeding while enjoying the benefits of the 
network. As a result, most P2P networks either remove the free-riders or to force them to 
contribute by making seeding mandatory. Open-source studies have shown that, in the absence 
of an expectation of reciprocity, the benefits that a P2P network can provide are unlikely to be 
realized (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Reciprocity can be self-reinforcing, because 
participants will share more when provided with an incentive that ensures reciprocity. Hence, 
Incentives Expectations Increase of SIS Behavior Change
1. Reciprocity
2. Value
3. Institutional design
4. Reputation
Positively moderated by trust 
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Proposition 1 
The increase in the frequency of SIS will depend on the extent to which investors expect an act 
of sharing to be reciprocated. 
Proposition 2 
The increase in the intensity of SIS will depend on the extent to which investors expect an act 
of sharing to be reciprocated. 
 
2.6 Value Expectation 
Previous studies have identified the value of the information obtained as a result of sharing as 
an important precursor to SIS (ENISA, 2011). SIS and cooperation between industry peers can 
improve the relevance, quality, and value of information, because the actors often face similar 
cyberthreats. Collective intelligence and crowdsourcing studies show that organizations 
working together have greater threat awareness. SIS can also place extra burdens on the 
participants if they lack the resources to understand and analyze the security information that 
is shared with them. Therefore, each investor is expected to conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
before deciding whether or not to engage in SIS. The benefits are likely to increase as the value 
of the information increases; ideally, an investor should conclude that the benefits of the 
security information received outweigh the costs of the security information shared. Cost 
saving is generally the most direct and visible benefit of SIS to the participants. This makes the 
cost argument both subordinate to and linked with the value argument. Therefore, we make the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 3 
The frequency of SIS will increase to the extent that investors expect an increase in the value 
of the information they hold. 
Proposition 4 
The intensity of SIS will increase to the extent that investors expect an increase in the value of 
the information they hold. 
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2.7 Institutional Expectation 
There is a consensus in the literature that the management and institutional design of an ISAC 
is key to building trust and facilitating effective SIS (Suter, 2012). A poorly designed ISAC 
can deter agents from joining, thus reducing the probability of an increase in SIS. Previous 
research identifies three elements that are key to an optimal structure: (1) leadership, (2) 
processing and labelling of shared information, and (3) secure storage and access to shared data 
(ENISA, 2016). A clear taxonomy is needed to create a common vocabulary and culture for 
participants. Next, minimal standards have to be implemented by the ISAC to organize the 
formation of the information that is shared. The central challenge in ISAC management is to 
create a core of quality participants, in order to encourage more quality participants to join and 
to avoid the introduction of free-riders (ENISA, 2009). Non-participants should perceive 
themselves to be missing access to important information. If the membership is too large, it is 
difficult to create relationships of trust; whereas if the membership is too small, the amount of 
shared data will be insufficiently attractive. A sound institutional design should result in a 
stable membership. Participants might be reluctant to engage in SIS activities if inappropriate 
actors are permitted to become members of the ISAC. It is essential that the platform applies 
up-to-date security standards, in order to provide a safe forum. Indeed, the high value of an 
ISAC database makes it a high-value target (HVT) for hackers. Therefore, we make the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 5 
The frequency of SIS will increase to the extent that investors trust the institutional 
management. 
Proposition 6 
The intensity of SIS will increase to the extent that investors trust the institutional management. 
 
2.8 Reputation Expectation 
Agents will evaluate the potential reputational benefits of their SIS activities, as well as the 
potential reputational risks. Participants are often reluctant to engage in SIS activities, fearing 
that the activities might be damaging to the reputation of the organization. Reputation is related 
to customer trust, the protection of customer data, and the quality of service offered (Gordon, 
Loeb, & Sohail, 2010). Common fears include information leaks and the use, by competitors, 
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of critical information to damage the reputation of the client. Studies have shown that 
disclosing information on a cyberattack can reduce consumer trust, strongly affecting the 
market value of the company (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003). As a result, agents 
have a keen interest in protecting their reputation. However, some participants might see SIS 
as a means to cultivating their reputation as good corporate citizens; associating with 
government agencies can also enhance the reputation of participants. The fear of being publicly 
accused of being a free-rider might also provide an incentive to participate in SIS. As 
reputations are strongly moderated by trust, this can mitigate the reputational problem. If agents 
know and trust each other they will not exploit any revealed weaknesses. Therefore, we make 
the following propositions:  
Proposition 7 
The frequency of SIS will increase to the extent that investors expect an improvement in 
reputation. 
Proposition 8 
The intensity of SIS will increase to the extent that investors expect an improvement in 
reputation. 
 
2.9 The Moderating Role of Trust 
The psychology literature suggests that knowledge-based trust might be the most significant in 
the context of SIS (Hämmerli, Raaum, & Franceschetti, 2013). Our assumption is that trust is 
a necessary condition for SIS, but not a sufficient one. As a result, the four main effects noted 
above will each be positively moderated by trust, hence strengthened when trust between 
agents is present. In many jurisdictions, government and private industry work together to 
create ISACs that are neutral and anonymous facilitators of social networks, thereby supporting 
the emergence of trusted relationships between cybersecurity investors, the private sector, and 
the government (Fernández Vázquez, Acosta, Spirito, Brown, & Reid, 2012). The existence of 
networks of collaboration and trust in other fields of activity can be used for SIS. For instance, 
pre-existing relationships between the private and the public sector can be used to build trust 
(Dunn Cavelty, 2014). Hence, 
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Proposition 9 
The relationship between the expectation of reciprocity and SIS will positively reflect the 
degree of trust between the sharing agents. 
Proposition 10 
The relationship between value expectations and SIS will positively reflect the degree of trust 
between the sharing agents. 
Proposition 11 
The relationship between institutional expectations and SIS will positively reflect the degree 
of trust between the sharing agents. 
Proposition 12 
The relationship between reputational expectations and SIS will positively reflect the degree 
of trust between the sharing agents. 
 
3. Application of the Proposed Model to Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Today, CIP is more of an economic policy than a technology policy. The capacity of a modern 
society to preserve the conditions of its existence is intimately linked to the proper operation 
of its CIs. Cybersecurity concerns are the main challenge faced by the operators of this 
infrastructure, not least because of the high degree of interconnection (Anderson & Fuloria, 
2010). This raises the threat of a cyber subprime scenario, i.e. a cascading series of failures 
from an attack on a single point in the infrastructure.9 As a consequence, most OECD countries 
have adopted national CIP programs to increase preparedness and improve their response 
capabilities to critical cyber incidents. To illustrate our theoretical framework, we present a 
case study showing how SIS can improve cybersecurity in the financial sector, a particularly 
sensitive area of CIP. The national financial infrastructure of Switzerland is highly important 
for national security, given the presence of at least five systemically strategic (too big to fail) 
banks. For a potential attacker, the Swiss financial system is an attractive target that can be 
attacked at very little cost. 
                                               
9 The interconnected 2008 global financial crisis bears several resemblances to a major cyber “risk nexus” 
scenario. 
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3.1 The Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security 
The Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security (MELANI) is a forum in 
which participants from the information security technology sector and CI providers share 
security information. The Centre is organized as a PPP between the federal government and 
private industry. It operates an ISAC (MELANI-Net that brings together over 150 CI providers 
from all sectors in Switzerland (Dunn Cavelty, 2014). To conduct this case study, we were 
granted access to the MELANI-Net quantitative log-file, as well as to the qualitative results of 
a survey conducted in 2016.10 Each of the four main effects and the moderating role of trust 
are illustrated with real examples. 
 
3.2 Reciprocity Expectation 
Only half of the MELANI-Net participants are active on the platform. A first analysis of the 
logfile suggested the existence of a free-rider problem. The main reason for this seems to be 
that some participants have no information to share, or they believe that the information they 
hold is insufficiently relevant to justify sharing. This phenomenon might be unrelated to the 
provision of incentives or the free-rider problem. However, it is possible that participants use 
these arguments merely as an excuse to justify free riding. The most promising reciprocity 
incentive appears to be the sharing of best practices, i.e. the response to a cyber incident. The 
fear of free-riders seems to be an important barrier to engaging in SIS. 
 
3.3 Value Expectation 
Participants appreciate the aggregated information received from MELANI, which is perceived 
as the main added-value of SIS. MELANI recently developed an information radar that 
provides CIs with an aggregated overview of the cyber-threat landscape in Switzerland. This 
is the product that is most appreciated by the financial sector. It gives CI providers a strong 
incentive to engage in a wider range of SIS activities, because in the future this could provide 
the basis for an SIS-Early Warning System (EWS) that controls and mitigates the cascade effect 
                                               
10 This internal survey does not conform to common practice in psychometrics. We could only use it to inspire 
future research and confirm the presence of a free-riding problem in our case study. 
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(Alcaraz, Balastegui, & Lopez, 2010). Participants reduce their costs through participation in 
SIS by benefiting from free MELANI consulting, IT support, and access to exclusive and 
timely cyber-threat intelligence (CTI) from the government. 
 
3.4 Institutional Expectation 
Most participants believe MELANI to be well-managed. The financial sector regards the 
MELANI staff as reliable and credible. Switzerland offers a conducive environment for SIS, 
with a low corruption rate and strong trust between the government, the citizens, and the 
industry. More than half of the participants have been members of the platform for more than 
five years. In the financial sector, a clear taxonomy has been established and most participants 
believe that the platform has the right number of participants. However, impediments remain 
to the development of effective SIS, including legal issues that deter CI providers from 
engaging in SIS activities. These include antitrust laws, patent protection, national security 
laws, and data-privacy laws, such as the Swiss banking-secrecy law. This law make sharing of 
client-related data problematic, especially in cross-border or multi-jurisdictional contexts. 
 
3.5 Reputation Expectation 
After the public disclosure of the Heartbleed security bug in 2014, the affected banks 
experienced a decrease in their market-share value. This event confirms that a security-
information leak can seriously damage the reputation of participants. Therefore, participants 
need to trust the ISAC with their reputation and anonymity preservation. As a result, the shared 
data has to be properly sanitized, in order to make sure that competitors can never use the 
shared information to damage another participants reputation. 
 
3.6 Setting the Optimal Size of SIS Circles 
The Swiss tradition of banking secrecy and non-cooperation in the financial sector is an 
established social norm that could act as an impediment to voluntary SIS. Surprisingly, the 
financial sector has the highest level of engagement in SIS activities and was the sector most 
willing to join MELANI at its foundation a decade ago. Over time, this has enabled the sector 
to build trust, based on already existing relationships and the regular face-to-face meetings at 
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workshops or roundtables that take place between the MELANI staff and their contacts in the 
banks. Hence, the financial sector participants are satisfied, in general, with the service 
received and appreciate the importance of MELANI for their own activities, the financial sector 
overall, and Switzerland’s national security. 
The participants’ willingness to engage in SIS activities reflects the levels of trust in three 
circles: the MELANI staff, the industry circle, and all of participants (Fig. 2). For each SIS 
transaction, participants can choose with which circle they want to engage. These established 
relationships enable the four effects discussed above to be moderated by trust. As a result, the 
trust that has been established over a long period in this sector positively influences our four 
expectations: reciprocity, value, institutional design, and reputation. 
 
Figure 2: MELANI Trust-Circles (Adapted from the Onion Model) 
 
 
4. Discussion 
Unlike in other OECD countries, CIs in Switzerland are not usually in competition, because 
most are state owned, especially those in the energy sector. Privately owned CI providers might 
have incentives and barriers different than state-owned providers. This would require further 
research and investigation. Some CI operators sometimes fail to engage in SIS activities simply 
because they have no information to share, whereas other CIs share security information 
because they have security incidents to report. This phenomenon is unrelated to the provision 
of incentives or the free-rider problem. Another possible bias that should be considered is the 
many SIS activities that take place outside MELANI-Net, for instance bilaterally, in peer-to-
peer groups, or through industry-based ISACs. This is typically the case in the financial 
industry, with its successfully established FS-ISAC (Liu, Zafar, & Au, 2014). Security solution 
vendors recently created the Cyber Threat Alliance, in order to engage in mutual SIS. A further 
example is the newly created Industrial Control System ISAC for threat intelligence sharing 
1. ISAC 
only
2. Industry circle
3. All CIs members 
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among nations.11 As a result, we were unable to observe the SIS activities that take place 
outside of MELANI-Net. 
 
5. Concluding Comments and Next Steps 
We provided a first blueprint for an innovative incentive-based SIS model, thus closing an 
important gap in the literature. This model can work as a complement to or an extension of the 
Gordon-Loeb model. Other economic and social incentives could be used to extend the 
expectations indicators in our model. The design and analysis of such alternative indicators is 
a task for future research. For instance, the criticality of a CI operator could be linked to the 
frequency and intensity of SIS. Indeed, systemic risks (too big to fail) and the large externalities 
associated with high criticality might provide an incentive to engage in extended SIS activities 
(Leu & Peter, 2016). This part is a conceptual work that is developed in Parts II and III. These 
developments, which focus on the generation of theories, are complemented by empirical 
propositions, testing, and policy recommendations at national and international levels. We hope 
that this study will inspire other researchers to extend and contribute to our model.   
                                               
11 The purpose of this platform is to bring together CI stakeholders in order to improve SIS at the international 
level. 
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Abstract 
Security information sharing (SIS) is an activity whereby individuals exchange information 
that is relevant to analyze or prevent cybersecurity incidents. However, despite technological 
advances and increased regulatory pressure, human individuals still seem reluctant to share 
security information. Few contributions have addressed this research gap to date. Adopting an 
interdisciplinary approach, our study proposes a behavioral framework that theorizes how and 
why human behavior and SIS may be associated. We use psychometric methods to test these 
associations, analyzing a unique sample of 262 human Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centre (ISAC) members who share real security information. We also provide a dual empirical 
operationalization of SIS by introducing the measures of SIS frequency and intensity. We find 
significant associations between human behavior and SIS. Thus, the study contributes to 
clarifying why SIS, while beneficial, is underutilized by pointing to the pivotal role of human 
behavior for economic outcomes. It therefore adds to the growing field of the economics of 
information security. By the same token, it informs managers and regulators about the 
significance of human behavior as they propagate goal alignment and shape institutions. 
Finally, the study defines a broad agenda for future research on SIS. 
 
Key words: security information sharing; psychometrics; economics of information security; 
behavioral economics; behavioral psychology. 
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1. Introduction 
Security information sharing (SIS) is an activity whereby individuals exchange information 
that is relevant to analyze or prevent cybersecurity incidents. Such information includes, but is 
not limited to, the identification of information system vulnerabilities, phishing attempts, 
malware, and data breaches, as well as results of intelligence analysis, best practices, early 
warnings, expert advice and general insights (Luiijf and Klaver, 2015). 
Prior research has proposed that SIS makes every unit of security investment more 
effective, such that individuals can reduce investments dedicated to generate cybersecurity in 
their organization. As a result of these individual improvements, total welfare is also likely to 
increase (Gordon et al., 2003; Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005). Hence, SIS likely contributes to 
strengthening the cybersecurity of firms, critical infrastructures, government, and society 
(Gordon et al., 2010, 2015a, 2015b; Hausken, 2015; Böhme, 2016).  
However, these theoretical expectations hardly seem to materialize. Recent contributions 
have noted that SIS is at suboptimal levels, implying negative consequences for the 
cybersecurity of organizations and society (Böhme, 2016). Game-theoretic simulation suggests 
that individuals may free-ride on the information provided by others while not sharing any 
information themselves (Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007). Researchers and international 
organizations have been warning for years that human individuals seem reluctant to share 
security information, although the technical infrastructure for information exchange does exist 
(Campbell et al., 2003; ENISA, 2010, 2016; Naghizadeh and Liu, 2016). In an attempt to 
alleviate this problem, legislators and regulators have attempted to make SIS mandatory.1 
However, reviews suggest that despite these attempts, individuals still seem reluctant share 
security information (Ghose and Hausken, 2006; Moran and Moore, 2010; Bisogni, 2015; 
Weiss, 2015). They may even ‘game’ the system in an attempt to circumvent regulation 
(Anderson and Fuloria, 2010; Moore, 2010; Moran and Moore, 2010). 
All these findings imply that human behavior may be significantly associated with the 
extent to which SIS occurs (if at all). It is therefore not surprising to see recent work 
emphasizing that the study of human behavior is key to the understanding of SIS (Böhme, 
                                               
1 For example, the USA created the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Act (CISA). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires organizations to report 
breaches of protected health information (PHI) to the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In 
December 2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity 
by proposing the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. 
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2016). More specifically, this work predicts that SIS can only be imperfectly understood unless 
the human motivation to (not) participate in SIS is studied (Harrison and White, 2012; Laube 
and Böhme, 2016; Vakilinia et al., 2017).  
However, few contributions have addressed this research gap to date. Since Laube and 
Böhme (2017) have provided an excellent account of the SIS literature, we refrain from 
replicating this account here. We rather point to the fact that this account shows that very few 
empirical studies on non-public SIS exist. These few studies concentrate on analyzing incident 
counts and aggregate data, but they do not study human behavior at the individual level of 
analysis (see Laube and Böhme, 2017: 28 for a tabulated overview). 
Our study intends to address this gap by proposing how and why human behavior and SIS 
may be associated, and by providing an empirical test of this association. As cybersecurity 
problems are unlikely to be resolved by information systems theory alone, we adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach as recommended by Anderson and Moore (2006). Recently, 
interdisciplinary studies were productive in showing the extent to which human behavior is 
associated with knowledge sharing (Yan et al., 2016; Safa and von Solms, 2016). 
We build a theoretical framework anchored in behavioral theory, arguing that SIS is 
associated with human behavior. We use psychometric methods to test these associations, 
analyzing a unique sample of 262 human ISAC members who share real security information. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the behavioral 
framework and deducts testable hypotheses from this framework. Section 3 details the 
sampling context, measures, and empirical. The results are explained in section 4. Section 5 
discusses both the theoretical, empirical and practical contributions our study makes and points 
to some limitations of our approach that open up paths for future research.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Behavioral research relativized some of the strong formal assumptions that neoclassical 
economics had ascribed to human behavior, particularly those of rationality, perfect 
information, and selfish utility maximization (homo oeconomicus). By contrast, it showed that 
human beings have bounded instead of perfect rationality. They often violate social 
expectations, have limited information processing capacity, use heuristics when making 
decisions, are affected by emotion while doing so, and retaliate even if the cost of retaliation 
exceeds its benefits (Simon, 1976; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; 
Bazerman, 2005; DellaVigna, 2009).  
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Moreover, humans do not necessarily maximize higher-level (i.e., organizational, societal) 
goals, even if it would be economically rational for them to do so. Theoretical work on SIS has 
suggested early that individual and organizational interests may not always be aligned and that 
the individual is not necessarily an indifferent agent (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2004). Goal-framing 
theory suggests that individual goals may not necessarily be congruent with higher-level goal 
frames, implying that the individual can defect from organizational maximization goals 
(Lindenberg and Foss, 2011). Particularly in the case of collective action, the individual may 
behave in ways that is not conducive to the overall group goal (Olson, 1965; Oliver, 1980). For 
the context of SIS, this research implies that individually, humans might not necessarily 
participate in SIS although it would be optimal to do so for society as a whole. 
Particularly, human exchange relationships are not necessarily characterized by rational 
economic optimization, but instead by human expectations about fairness, reciprocity, and trust 
(Malhotra, 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Therefore, the 
argument can be made that SIS may be associated with human behavior. Indeed, prior research 
argues that the understanding of SIS requires an analysis of what behavior may motivate 
humans to participate in SIS, and what may deter them from doing so (Aviram and Tor, 2003; 
Bauer and van Eeten, 2009). 
Human behavior is the result of human motivation, intention and volition. It manifests 
itself in goal-directed (i.e., nonrandom) and observable actions (Watzlawick et al., 2011; Smith 
and Winterhalder, 2017; Tomasello et al., 2005). Sharing information implies human action 
from at least the side of the individual who shares. Moreover, SIS constitutes an economic 
transaction by which knowledge resources are shared, rather than acquired (Bock et al., 2005). 
Hence, SIS differs from discrete arm’s length transactions whereby a single individual simply 
trades financial means for access to information. Instead, SIS is characterized by continued 
social interaction among many individuals who mutually exchange information assets (Yan et 
al., 2016).  
Therefore, humans are unlikely to randomly participate in SIS, such that SIS does not 
occur ‘naturally’. Hence, theorizing is required regarding how and why human behavior may 
be associated with SIS. Applying prior behavioral research to our research context, we develop 
testable hypotheses about five salient constructs which may be associated with SIS. In all of 
these hypotheses, our focal individual is an indifferent human individual who, independently 
of the motives of other individuals, ponders whether or not to participate in SIS. We believe 
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this perspective is conservative and conducive to empirical analysis since it neither requires 
assumptions about the behavior of other individuals nor a dyadic research setting. 
 
2.1 Attitude 
Behavioral theory suggests that attitudes have a directive influence on human behavior (Ajzen, 
1996). Attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity 
with some degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Hence, an individual’s 
favorable or unfavorable attitude towards a particular behavior predicts the extent to which this 
behavior actually occurs (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen and Madden, 1986). 
Much empirical work has confirmed and detailed this attitude-behavior link, particularly 
in the context of information systems adoption and intention to use (see Belletier et al., 2018 
and Kroenung and Eckhard, 2015 for extensive literature reviews). More specifically, Bock et 
al. (2005) find that this attitude-behavior link influences individuals’ intention to share 
knowledge.  
Drawing on prior empirical work in behavioral psychology, Safa and von Solms (2016) 
also found support for the hypothesis that an affirmative attitude towards knowledge sharing 
positively influences participation rates. Descriptive work has conjectured (though not tested 
or confirmed) that individual attitudes about the meaningfulness of SIS might be associated 
with actual participation in SIS (ENISA, 2010). Therefore, if the focal individual has a positive 
attitude towards SIS, s/he should be more likely to participate in SIS. Therefore,  
H1: SIS is positively associated with the extent to which the focal individual has a positive 
attitude towards SIS. 
 
2.2 Reciprocity 
Behavioral theory suggests that human behavior is characterized by inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999). As they socially interact with others, humans expect to receive equitable 
compensation whenever they voluntarily give something to others, and they punish those 
unwilling to give something in return (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Tricomi et al., 2010). Hence, 
when humans are treated in a particular way, they reciprocate, i.e., they respond likewise (Fehr 
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and Gächter, 2000). As a result, reciprocity is a shared behavioral norm among human beings 
that governs their social cooperation (Gouldner, 1960; Fehr and Gintis, 2007). 
Economic exchange relationships are therefore shaped by the reciprocity expectations of 
the participants involved in this exchange (Kolm and Ythier, 2006). In such relationships, 
reciprocity is a dominant strategy that is conducive to a socially efficient distribution of 
resources (Andreoni, 1995; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Therefore, the extent to which the 
focal individual participates in information exchange is likely associated with that individual’s 
expectation that his/her efforts are reciprocated. 
For example, reciprocal fairness is an important variable in the design of peer selection 
algorithms in peer-to-peer networks. By integrating reciprocal response patterns such as ‘tit-
for-tat’, operators can optimize peer-to-peer traffic (Wang et al., 2011). The value of a unit of 
security information is proportional to the incremental security enhancement that this unit is 
supposed to provide to the recipient (Bodin et al., 2018; Gordon et al., 2016). Hence, whenever 
the focal individual shares such information units, it creates value for the counterparty. By the 
above arguments, the focal individual likely refuses to participate in future exchanges unless 
such value creation is reciprocated by the counterparty.  
On the one hand, the focal individual may expect that information sharing is reciprocated 
by ‘hard rewards’, i.e. in monetary terms, by a higher status inside the ISAC or his or her own 
organization, or in terms of career prospects (transactional reciprocity). On the other hand, the 
focal individual may also expect that whenever s/he shares a unit of information, s/he receives 
useful information in return, such that a continuous social interaction that is beneficial to both 
parties emerges (social reciprocity). Prior research suggests that both these types of reciprocity 
are associated with information exchange patterns between individuals (Kwahk and Park, 2016; 
Siegrist et al., 2004; Paese and Gilin, 2000). Therefore,  
H2a: SIS is positively associated with the extent to which the focal individual expects his 
or her information sharing to be transactionally reciprocated. 
H2b: SIS is positively associated with the extent to which the focal individual expects his 
or her information sharing to be socially reciprocated. 
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2.3 Executional Cost 
Behavioral theory suggests that humans are loss-averse, i.e. they attempt to avoid economic 
losses more than they attempt to realize economic benefits. Much experimental research has 
confirmed this tendency (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992; 
Tom et al., 2007).  
An economic exchange relationship can be fraught with significant transaction cost, i.e. 
the time, material, and financial resources that the focal individual must commit before an 
exchange is made (Williamson, 1981). Hence, if SIS is associated with high transaction costs 
for participation, the focal individual is likely to avoid the necessary resource commitments to 
finance this cost. For example, Yan et al. (2016) argue that when knowledge contribution 
requires significant time, sharing tends to be inhibited. Consistent with their conceptualization, 
we term such transaction costs ‘executional cost’. 
As a result, in the presence of high executional cost, the focal individual likely adapts his 
or her behavior in an attempt to avoid these costs. For instance, if the focal individual learns 
that in a given ISAC environment, SIS is taking too much time, is too laborious, or requires 
too much effort, the individual likely reduces or terminates participation in SIS (Luiijf and 
Klaver, 2015). For example, an abundance of procedural rules that govern the processing and 
labelling of shared information and the secure storage and access to shared data likely stalls 
information sharing activity (ENISA, 2016). Thus, high executional cost likely dissuades the 
focal individual from participating in SIS. Therefore, 
H3: SIS is negatively associated with the extent to which the focal individual expects 
information sharing to be fraught with executional cost.  
 
2.4 Reputation 
Behavioral theory suggests that humans deeply care about being recognized and accepted by 
others (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Many philosophers have 
argued that the desire for social esteem fundamentally influences human behavior and, as a 
result, economic action (Brennan and Pettit, 2004).  
Depending on the outcomes of particular social interactions with other individuals, the 
focal individual earns or loses social esteem. Hence, over time each individual builds a 
reputation, i.e. a socially transmitted assessment by which other individuals judge the focal 
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individual’s social esteem (Emler, 1990; McElreath, 2003). For example, academic researchers 
strive to increase the reputation of their department by publishing scholarly work (Keith and 
Babchuk, 1998). The desire to earn a reputation as a competent developer is a strong motivator 
for individuals to participate in open source software development although they receive no 
monetary compensation for the working hours they dedicate to this development (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003).  
When this reasoning is transferred to the context of SIS, the focal individual may be 
inclined to share information because s/he hopes to build or improve his or her reputation 
among the other participants of SIS. Prior research suggests that this desire constitutes an 
extrinsic motivation that may be associated with an individual’s intention to share information 
(Chang and Chuang, 2011; Park et al., 2014), and intention is a precursor of behavior. 
Therefore, 
H4: SIS is positively associated with the extent to which the focal individual expects 
information sharing to promote his or her reputation in the sharing community. 
 
2.5 Trust 
Behavioral theory suggests that humans simplify complex decision-making by applying 
heuristics (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), particularly when they 
attempt to reduce the cost of information acquisition and valuation (Gabaix et al., 2006).  
Whenever a focal individual is unable or unwilling to objectively evaluate information 
conveyed by other individuals, s/he likely resorts to heuristics to simplify the evaluation 
process (Chaiken, 1980). In the context of SIS, this implies that whenever the focal individual 
receives security information from another individual, s/he cannot necessarily be sure about 
the extent to which (if any) this information is valuable or useful. This assessment is associated 
with significant transaction cost, e.g. for due diligence procedures that attempt to value the 
information received. The individual may also lack technological competence and expertise, 
such that time-consuming discussions with experts are required for proper valuation. All in all, 
upon the receipt of a particular unit of information, the focal individual is faced with a complex 
valuation problem which s/he may seek to simplify by applying heuristics.  
Trust is an implicit set of beliefs that the other party will behave in a reliable manner 
(Gefen et al., 2003). This set of beliefs is a particularly effective heuristic because it can reduce 
the transaction cost associated with this valuation. If the focal individual trusts the information 
PART II: Empirical Analysis 
 80 
received is useful and valuable, s/he can simplify evaluation procedures, and particularly so if 
the involved individuals interact in dense networks with agreed standards of behavior. 
Therefore, trust is a facilitator of economic organization and interaction (McEvily et al., 2003; 
Granovetter, 1985). For example, mutual trust among the participants of peer-to-peer networks 
can reduce transactional uncertainty (Xiong and Liu, 2004). Moreover, trust can mitigate 
information asymmetry by reducing transaction-specific risks (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). It is also 
a significant predictor of participation in virtual knowledge sharing communities (Ridings et 
al., 2002). 
Such trust, in turn, is positively associated with knowledge sharing in both direct and 
indirect ways (Hsu et al., 2002), whereas distrust is an obstacle to knowledge sharing (Amayah, 
2013). More specifically, trust is a facilitator in information security knowledge sharing 
behavior (Safa and von Solms, 2016). Thus, the extent to which the focal individual trusts the 
information s/he receives is valuable should be positively associated with his or her propensity 
to participate in SIS. Therefore,  
H5: SIS is positively associated with the extent to which the focal individual trusts that the 
counterparty provides valuable information. 
 
2.6 Interaction Effects 
By consequence, we suggest that trust negatively moderates the associations between attitude 
and reciprocity on the one hand and SIS on the other hand. We argued that trust is a facilitator 
of economic exchange. In other words, trust likely reduces the focal individual’s perceived cost 
of engaging in SIS, in that s/he requires fewer or lesser alternative stimuli (Lindenberg and 
Foss, 2011). A neutral focal individual who has not participated in SIS before is unlikely to 
participate unless s/he has a positive attitude towards SIS. That individual must hence construct 
the meaningfulness of SIS internally, i.e. convince him- or herself that SIS is useful. By 
contrast, if the focal individual trusts that the information s/he receives will be useful, s/he uses 
the counterparty to externally confirm such meaningfulness of SIS. The process of the internal 
construction of the meaningfulness of SIS is therefore at least partially substituted by the 
external, trust-based affirmation of such meaningfulness. We would hence expect that the 
significance of the association between attitude and SIS decreases with the extent to which the 
focal individual trusts the information s/he receives will be useful.  
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By the same token, since trust is a facilitator of economic exchange, it likely reduces the 
association between reciprocity and SIS. An indifferent focal individual cannot be completely 
sure about the behavior of the exchange counterparty, such that s/he requires continuous 
transactional or social reciprocity for SIS to perpetuate the exchange. In the absence of any 
trust that the information received is useful, SIS likely ends as soon as this reciprocity 
requirement is no longer met. By contrast, whenever the focal individual trusts that the 
information s/he receives will be useful, s/he has a motive to participate in SIS that is 
independent of such reciprocity concerns. Hence, trust is likely to act at least partially as a 
substitute for reciprocity, such that the focal individual should emphasize to a lesser extent that 
reciprocity will be required if s/he is expected to begin or perpetuate SIS. Therefore,  
H6a-c: The extent to which the focal individual trusts that information received from the 
counterparty is effective negatively moderates the respective positive associations between 
attitude, transactional, and social reciprocity on the one hand and SIS on the other hand. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sampling Context and Population  
Our study focused on the 424 members of the closed user group of the Swiss national ISAC, 
the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI-Net). An ISAC is an 
organization that brings together cybersecurity managers in person to facilitate SIS between 
operators of critical infrastructures. For a general introduction to the concept of an ISAC, see 
Zhao and White (2012). For some illustrative examples of ISACs across different countries, 
see ENISA (2017). For a detailed description of MELANI-Net, its organization and history, 
see Dunn Cavelty (2014: 39-54). The ISAC we study is organized as a public-private 
partnership between the government and private industry; it operates on a not-for-profit basis. 
Membership in MELANI-Net is voluntary. In Switzerland, there is no regulation that makes 
SIS mandatory, hence, individuals are free to share or not share information, and they can also 
control the group of individuals with whom they want to share the information. This implies 
our study design can capture the full range of human behavior from perfect cooperation to total 
refusal. 
 The members of the closed user group are all senior managers in charge of providing 
cybersecurity for their respective organizations. They come from both private critical 
infrastructure operators and from the public sector. They have to undergo government 
PART II: Empirical Analysis 
 82 
identification and clearance procedures as well as background checks before being admitted 
for ISAC membership. They share classified, highly sensitive information the leaking or abuse 
of which may cause significant economic damage. There is no interaction of these members 
with the public whatsoever, and no external communication to the public or any publication of 
SIS results is made. For all of these members, the exchange of SIS can be assumed to be 
relevant, as they manage critical infrastructures that are ultimately all connected and operate 
with similar IT systems, such that cybersecurity problems that relate to any particular 
individual are likely of interest to other participants too.  
Within this closed user group, individuals can contact each other by an internal message 
board whenever a particular individual has shared information about a threat that is of interest 
to other members. They do so by commenting on the initial information shared in order to 
establish a first contact which then leads to further social exchange between the two individuals. 
Once contact is made by a short reply to the threat information, the individuals involved in the 
conversation meet on their own initiative to share detailed security information between them 
(e.g., informally over lunch, in group meetings, or small industry-specific conferences, but 
always face-to-face). Each individual decides for him- or herself if s/he wants to meet, with 
whom, and in what form. They also freely decide about the extent of the information shared (if 
any). MELANI-Net officials neither force nor encourage individuals to interact; both in terms 
of social interaction in general and regarding the sharing of any particular unit of information. 
 
3.2 Measures 
Our study analyzes human behavior on the individual level of analysis. We therefore chose a 
psychometric approach to operationalize our constructs (Nunnally and Bernstein, 2017). We 
adopted psychometric scales from the extant measurement literature wherever possible and 
kept specific adaptions to our population context to a minimum. Table 1 explains and details 
all variables, their item composition and wording (if applicable), dropped items (if any), factor 
loadings, and Cronbach alphas and cites the sources they were taken from.  
SIS is operationalized dually by the two constructs frequency and intensity. Intensity 
measures the extent to which the focal individual reacts to any threat information shared by 
another individual and thus begins social interaction with that other individual. Intensity is thus 
a reactive measure of how intensely the focal individual engages in knowledge sharing with 
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others upon being informed of a threat.2 Since information sharing is not mandatory, this 
measure captures the individual’s free choice to (not) engage in exchange relationships with 
other individuals. By contrast, frequency is a proactive measure; it captures how often an 
individual shares security information that s/he possesses him- or herself. 
To capture respondent heterogeneity, we controlled for gender, age, and education level. 
Further, we controlled for the individual’s ISAC membership duration in years, because a 
respondent’s sharing activity may co-evolve with the length of ISAC membership. Gender was 
coded dichotomously (male, female). Age was captured in four mutually exclusive categories 
(21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 50+ years). Education was captured by six mutually exclusive categories 
(none, bachelor, diploma, master, PhD, other). We also controlled for the industry affiliation 
of the organization that the individual represents. 
 
3.3 Implementation 
Data for all variables was collected from individual respondents by a questionnaire instrument. 
We followed the procedures and recommendations of Dillman et al. (2014) for questionnaire 
design, pre-test, and implementation. Likert-scaled items were anchored at “strongly disagree” 
(1) and “strongly agree” (5) with “neutral” as the midpoint. Categories for the measure intensity 
were ordered hierarchically. 
The questionnaire was developed as a paper instrument first. It was pre-tested with seven 
different focus groups from academia and the cybersecurity industry. Feedback obtained was 
used to improve the visual presentation of the questionnaire and to add additional explanations. 
This feedback also indicated that respondents could make valid and reliable assessments. 
Within the closed user group, both MELANI-Net officials and members communicate 
with each other in English. Switzerland has four official languages, none of which is English, 
and all constructs we used for measurement were originally published in English. We therefore 
chose to implement the questionnaire in English to rule out any back-translation problems. 
Before implementation, we conducted pre-tests to make sure respondents had the necessary 
                                               
2 The measure intensity is ordered and categorical in that it asks respondents to provide an estimate rather than an 
exact percentage figure. We preferred this approach in order to give respondents an opportunity to provide an 
estimate, such that they would not be deterred by the need to provide an exact figure. For the same reason, we 
preferred a scale-based over a percentage measure for frequency. We also captured an alternative measure of 
intensity by a Likert scale, but found that models with the ordered categorical measure fit the data better. 
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language skills. The cover page of the survey informed respondents about the research project 
and our goals and also made clear that we had no financial or business-related interest. 
The paper instrument was then implemented as a web-based survey using SelectSurvey 
software provided by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. For reasons of data 
security, the survey was hosted on the proprietary servers of this university. The management 
of MELANI-Net invited all closed user group members to respond to the survey by sending an 
anonymized access link, such that the anonymity of respondents was guaranteed at all times. 
Respondents could freely choose whether or not to reply. As a reward for participation, 
respondents were offered a research report free of charge that summarized the responses. 
Respondents could freely choose to save intermediate questionnaire completions and return to 
the survey and complete it at a later point in time.  
The online questionnaire and the reminders were sent to the population by the Deputy 
Head of MELANI-Net together with a letter of endorsement. The survey link was sent in an e-
mail describing the authors, the data, contact details for IT support, the offer of a free report, 
and the scope of our study. Data collection began on October 12, 2017 and ended on December 
1, 2017. Two reminders were sent on October 26 and November 9, 2017. Of all 424 members, 
262 had responded when the survey was closed, for a total response rate of 62%. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
Upon completion of the survey, sample data were exported from the survey server, manually 
inspected for consistency and then converted into a STATA dataset (Vol. 15) on which all 
further statistical analysis was performed. Post-hoc tests suggested no significant influence of 
response time on any measure. There was no significant overrepresentation of individuals 
affiliated with any particular organization, suggesting no need for a nested analytical design.  
We performed principal component factor analysis with oblique rotation on all items. 
Validity was tested by calculating item-test, item-rest, and average inter-item correlations. 
Reliability was measured by Cronbach alpha. High direct factor-loadings and low cross-
loadings indicate a high degree of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2009). The final matrix 
suggested seven factors with an eigenvalue above unity. The first factor explained 14.56% of 
the total variance, suggesting the absence of significant common method variance in the sample 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The detailed factor-loadings and their diagnostic measures are 
given in Table 2. Upon this analysis, three items were dropped (viz. Table 1) because they had 
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low direct and high cross factor loadings. Finally, for any scale, individual item scores were 
added, and this sum was divided by the number of items in the scale (Reinholt et al., 2011; 
Trevor and Nyberg, 2008). 
The construct intensity is ordered and categorical, therefore we estimated ordered probit 
models. A comparison with an alternative ordered logit estimation confirmed the original 
estimations and indicated the ordered probit model fit the data slightly better. The construct 
frequency is conditioned on values between 1 and 5, therefore we estimated Tobit models. Both 
models were estimated with robust standard errors to neutralize any potential heteroscedasticity. 
Consistent with the recommendation of Cohen et al. (2002), we incrementally built all models 
by entering only the controls in a baseline model first, then added the main effects, and finally 
entered the interaction effects. In both estimations, we mean centered the measures before 
entering them into the analysis. Model fit was assessed by repeated comparisons of Akaike and 
Bayesian information criteria between different specifications. 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 4 specifies Spearman correlations; 
for the sake of brevity, correlates for controls are omitted. Table 5 documents the two final, 
best-fitting models and their respective diagnostic measures.  
H1 is partially supported. A positive attitude towards SIS is positively associated with the 
intensity (p < 0.05), but not with the frequency of SIS. This may suggest that whenever the 
focal individual believes SIS is an effective activity, his or her behavior is responsive to 
information shared by other individuals.  
H2a is fully supported. Social reciprocity is associated with both the intensity (p < 0.01) 
and the frequency of SIS (p < 0.05). This finding is in line with our theoretical expectation that 
individuals seek equitable exchange relationships in which cooperative behavior is rewarded. 
Future research may longitudinally study such social interaction over time with a dyadic 
research setting, studying how exchange patterns of repeated reciprocation develop over time. 
H2b is partially supported. Transactional reciprocity is associated with the frequency of 
SIS (p < 0.01), but not with its intensity. This may imply that transactional rewards such as 
bonuses or promotion motivate individuals to share knowledge, they already possess with 
others in order to signal a high level of productive activity vis-à-vis their superiors.  
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H3 is fully supported. Consistent with our theoretical expectation, executional cost is 
negatively associated with both the frequency (p < 0.05) and the intensity (p < 0.001) of SIS. 
This not only signals that executional cost constitutes a form of transaction cost that may deter 
individuals from sharing, as we hypothesized. The negative association with intensity is much 
stronger, suggesting that the negative association of executional cost is larger when the focal 
individual reacts to information shared by others. In other words, in the presence of high 
executional cost, individuals seem to be punished for reacting. Since our research design only 
accounted for the presence of executional cost, more research is required to identify the 
institutional or organizational sources of this cost. 
H4 is not supported. Contrary to what we hypothesized, we find no support for the claim 
that an individuals’ expectation to increase his or her status or social esteem is associated with 
SIS. Our measure of reputation is neither significantly associated with the intensity nor with 
the frequency of SIS. This negative result may be due to the fact that Yan et al. (2016) 
introduced their measure of reputation (which we use in our empirical study) in the context of 
public knowledge sharing among private individuals who vie for public social esteem. By 
contrast, we study a population of security professionals in the context of a private setting in 
which sensitive and classified information is shared. This may imply that, insofar as security 
information sharing is concerned, future research should propose alternative measures of 
reputation that are congruent with this context. 
H5 is partially supported. The extent to which the focal individual trusts the information 
received will be useful is positively associated with the frequency (p < 0.01), but not with the 
intensity of SIS. This may imply that a focal individual who has such trust would be more 
willing to share knowledge s/he already possesses. In this respect, more research is required 
regarding the relationship between initial trust among individuals and the evolution of such 
trusts as exchange relationships unfold. 
As regards the interaction effects, we find that H6a is partially supported. The extent to 
which the focal individual trusts the information received will be useful negatively moderates 
the relationship between attitude and the intensity (p < 0.05), but not the frequency of SIS. This 
may imply that trust can function as a partial substitute for attitude, in that the focal individual 
needs to convince him- or herself to a lesser extent that SIS is useful in general if that individual 
trusts the particular information s/he is about to receive is useful.  
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H6b is not supported. The extent to which the focal individual trusts the information 
received will be useful neither moderates the positive association of social reciprocity with the 
intensity of SIS nor that with the frequency of SIS. This may imply that, unlike in the above 
case for H6a, the focal individual’s trust that any particular unit of information is useful cannot 
function as a substitute for the importance of social reciprocity in the exchange relationship as 
such. 
H6c is fully supported. The extent to which the focal individual trusts the counterparty 
provides valuable information, negatively moderates both the association of transactional 
reciprocity with the frequency (p < 0.01) and with the intensity (p < 0.05) of SIS. In line with 
our theoretical reasoning, this result may suggest that trust can help the focal individual to 
convince him- or herself that the exchange relationship is equitable (since the information s/he 
is about to receive is trusted to be useful), such that the focal individual has to rely less on the 
expectation that s/he will be compensated by monetary or career benefits whenever s/he 
participates in exchange relationships. 
Finally, the fact that we find partial support for H1, H2b, H5 and H6a suggests that a 
differentiation of the theoretical construct SIS into different measurement constructs is 
productive. Future research may further develop the measures of frequency and intensity we 
have proposed here or develop yet other detailed operationalizations. 
As regards our control variables, we find no significant association of respondents’ 
demographic heterogeneity, length of membership in MELANI-Net, or industry affiliation 
with SIS. The latter non-finding also alleviates concerns of overrepresentation of a particular 
industry or firm among the responses. For the controls age, industry, and education, a 
benchmark category was automatically selected during estimation for every control (viz. 
footnote b to Table 5).  
The only significant association we find relates to the control education in the model for 
the frequency of SIS. Since the education category ‘other’ is used as the benchmark, the results 
suggest that in comparison to individuals with an education captured by ‘other’, the remaining 
individuals in all other education categories share significantly less in terms of frequency (p < 
0.01, respectively), whereas no association with intensity is presented. Since all other 
categories capture academic degrees and the case of no education, this may imply that 
individuals who have a non-academic education (e.g., vocational training) share knowledge 
they possess more often with other individuals, probably because they are industry practitioners 
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who wish to propagate information, they possess throughout respective their industries to 
strengthen organizational practice. 
 
5. Discussion 
Building on prior research in the field of the economics of information security and adopting a 
behavioral framework to organize our theoretical reasoning, we have proposed how and why 
human behavior should be associated with SIS. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first that associates the actual sharing of sensitive information among real human individuals 
inside a private Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC) with the behavior of these 
individuals. We also provide a dual empirical operationalization of SIS by introducing the 
measures of SIS frequency and intensity. Our study thus provides a first step towards an 
empirical corroboration of prior theoretical and game-theoretic reasoning on SIS. It also 
confirms that interdisciplinary approaches which attempt to integrate thinking from economics 
and psychology are useful when SIS is studied (Anderson and Moore, 2006).  
Our study also contributes to prior work that has both theoretically predicted and 
descriptively noted that SIS, while beneficial, is underutilized (Campbell et al., 2003; ENISA, 
2010, 2016; Naghizadeh and Liu, 2016; Ghose and Hausken, 2006; Moran and Moore, 2010; 
Bisogni, 2015; Weiss, 2015). We provide some first empirical evidence on the association of 
particular human behaviors with SIS among individuals in a private ISAC setting. The study 
also contributes to understanding the theoretical prediction that actual SIS may not reach its 
societally optimal level (Gordon et al., 2003; Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005) by suggesting that 
human behavior may be at the core of this problem. At the same time, we would caution 
regulators and researchers to infer that SIS should be mandated (i.e., that individuals should be 
forced to share) as a consequence of this problem. Adjusting sanction levels for failure to 
comply with mandatory SIS could be difficult, if not impossible (Laube and Böhme, 2016). 
Moreover, regulations that attempt to solve the ‘sharing dilemma’ in SIS should try to fix 
causes, not symptoms (Böhme, 2016). Our study neither employed a longitudinal research 
design nor did we collect time-series data, therefore, we cannot establish causal relationships 
between human behavior and SIS. Nevertheless, the negative and significant association 
between executional cost and both the frequency and intensity of SIS that we identify confirms 
prior research that finds that institutions shape human interaction and behavior. Institutions are 
formal and informal rules which govern human behavior by rewarding desirable actions and 
making undesirable actions more expensive or punishable (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990, 2005). 
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The organization of an ISAC is shaped by both internal institutions (i.e., rules voluntarily 
agreed to among ISAC participants and organizers) and external institutions (i.e., rules imposed 
onto them by government and regulatory authorities). Since high executional cost can be 
attributed to both effects, legislators and regulators should be careful to predict the impact and 
consequences of intended regulation for the executional cost of SIS. The association between 
executional cost and SIS that our study identifies suggests that humans are likely to assess the 
economic consequences of external institutions in terms of executional costs and adapt their 
behavior accordingly. Moreover, we find that both social and transaction reciprocity are 
positively associated with both the frequency and the intensity of SIS. Since reciprocity is a 
social norm, it cannot be forced by formal regulation and constraint, and the attempt to do so 
may induce individuals to comply with the letter rather than the spirit of the law by sharing 
irrelevant, non-timely, or false information (Burr, 2015). 
We believe that the future study of these issues opens up promising paths for research that 
can both explain why individuals attempt to circumvent SIS regulation and suggest more 
conducive institutions. In this way, our study provides a stepping stone on which researchers 
can build to resolve the paradox that actual SIS, while considered highly useful in general, is 
at low levels, and that individuals attempt to circumvent regulation that makes SIS mandatory 
(Anderson and Fuloria, 2010; Moore, 2010; Moran and Moore, 2010; ENISA, 2010, 2016). At 
this time, we speculate that a liberal institutional environment that attempts to make individuals 
comply by ‘nudging’ them is probably more conducive than the attempt to enforce compliance 
by coercion (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). We leave it to future research to either corroborate or 
refute this speculation, suggesting that irrespective of any institutional arrangement, human 
behavior is significantly associated with SIS, and that human behavior as regards SIS responds 
to institutional arrangements.  
From a practical perspective, our findings support the presumption that the ‘biggest 
obstacles [for SIS] are economic (dis)incentives, not a lack of technology’ (Böhme, 2016). Our 
empirical approach takes the technological context as a given and focuses on identifying 
associations between human behavior and SIS. Cybersecurity managers in organizations can 
benefit from these results as they attempt to make individuals comply with organizational goals. 
Our results suggest that both the frequency and the intensity of SIS are associated with human 
behavior. Managers should therefore be careful to study these associations when they define 
organizational goals and accept that individual human behavior does not necessarily comply 
with these unless appropriate goal alignment is provided (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011; Hume, 
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2000). For example, managers may facilitate an individual’s participation in SIS by reducing 
the executional cost of information exchange, or they may provide the focal individual with 
intelligence on counterparties to help them assess the likelihood with which information 
sharing may be reciprocated.  
Our study is pioneering in the sense that it studies real human beings and their self-reported 
behavior in the context of a real ISAC. Nevertheless, it merely studies a single, centrally 
organized ISAC in a single country. Hence, future research should generalize our approach to 
alternative models of ISAC organization and explore diverse national and cultural settings by 
replicating our study with different ISACs and nation-states. We believe our approach is 
conducive to such generalization since neither our theoretical framework, nor any one of our 
behavioral constructs, nor the empirical measures we used to operationalize these are context-
specific to any particular national or cultural context. Our measures and the theory in which 
they are grounded rather represent fundamental aspects of human behavior which, in our view, 
should apply globally. Thus, future work could complement our study with data from different 
ISACs, such that a transnational continuum of sharing intensities and frequencies could be 
constructed. This continuum would allow researchers to identify commonalities and 
differences in information exchange patterns and use these insights to propose expedient policy 
options.  
Finally, the ISACs that exist as of today have evolved from trade associations, government 
agencies, and public-private partnerships. However, the evolution of such historical trajectories 
is subject to technological change (Nelson and Winter, 1982). We therefore believe that novel 
technologies could facilitate human interaction in future ISAC configurations. For example, 
since the cost of reputation losses upon security breaches can be interpreted as privacy risk 
(Böhme, 2016), insights from privacy research and secure distributed computation and 
interaction (e.g., Ezhei and Ladani, 2017) might be used to construct distributed ISACs with 
safe real-time participation. Future research may use our study to consider the impact of such 
novel technological approaches on human behavior to prevent unintended consequences. 
From a broader perspective, our study design has some limitations that point to 
opportunities for future research.3 First, both as regards the level and the unit of analysis, our 
study focuses on the human individual. This implies that interactions between the individual 
                                               
3 We thank two anonymous reviewers for providing us with suggestions how our approach may be expanded and 
generalized. 
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and the organizational and institutional contexts within which the focal individual acts are 
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, our setting may be expanded both theoretically 
and empirically to incorporate such multilevel interactions. For example, the organizational-
level performance implications of SIS could be studied, in that future research would analyze 
the association of individual behavior with organizational results, such as increased 
cybersecurity or increased performance.  
In particular, future research may analyze the extent to which different organizational 
processes, cultures, and risk management approaches are associated with SIS by way of human 
behavior. For example, critical infrastructure providers who face significant risks of business 
interruption and going concern if their cybersecurity is compromised may emphasize more than 
other organizations that SIS is desirable and hence direct their employees to act accordingly. 
Thus, organizational policy may mediate the association between human behavior and SIS. 
Future research could build on our approach by developing more complex multilevel study 
designs that can incorporate such additional sources of variance. 
Finally, our study design is cross-sectional, implying that we can only claim association, 
but not causation. While we believe this is acceptable given the pioneering nature of this study, 
longitudinal study designs are required to establish causality. Such studies may 
ethnographically analyze human interaction within an ISAC over time, log how and why 
behavior changes, and infer how this behavioral evolution operates on SIS outcomes.   
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7. Appendix 
Table 1: Constructs, Items and Scales Used in the Survey 
 
Measures 
(Source) 
Type Item Text Factor 
loading 
Cronbach 
alpha 
SIS constructs 
Intensity 
of SIS 
(novel) 
Ordered 
categorical 
measure 
n/a How often do you comment on shared information? 
* Never 
* Rarely, in less than 10% of the chances when I could have 
* Occasionally, in about 30% of the chances when I could have 
* Sometimes, in about 50% of the chances when I could have 
* Frequently, in about 70% of the chances when I could have 
* Usually, in about 90% of the chances I could have 
* Every time 
n/a n/a 
      
Frequency 
of SIS 
(Safa & von 
Solms, 2016) 
Likert 
scale 
ISKS1 I frequently share my experience about information security with MELANI 0.8075 
0.8945 
ISKS2 I frequently share my information security knowledge with MELANI 0.8903 
ISKS3 I frequently share my information security documents with MELANI 0.8850 
ISKS4 I frequently share my expertise from my information security training with MELANI 0.8600 
ISKS5 I frequently talk with others about information security incidents and their solutions in 
MELANI workshops 
0.6898 
Behavioral constructs 
Attitude 
(Safa & von 
Solms, 2016) 
Likert 
scale 
AT1 I think SIS behavior is a valuable asset in the organization dropped 
0.6761 AT2 I believe SIS is a useful behavioral tool to safeguard the organization's information assets 0.7751 AT3 My SIS has a positive effect on mitigating the risk of information security breaches 0.6376 
AT4 SIS is a wise behavior that decreases the risk of information security incidents 0.7849 
      
Transactional 
reciprocity 
(Wang and 
Hou, 2015) 
Likert 
scale 
HR1 I expect to be rewarded with a higher salary in return for sharing knowledge with other 
participants 
0.8822 0.7956 
 
 
HR2 I expect to receive monetary rewards (i.e., additional bonus) in return for sharing knowledge 
with other participants 
0.8743 
HR3 I expect to receive opportunities to learn from others in return for sharing knowledge with other 
participants 
dropped 
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HR4 I expect to be rewarded with an increased job security in return for sharing knowledge with 
other participants 
0.7499 
Social 
reciprocity 
(Kwahk and 
Park, 2016) 
     
Likert 
scale 
NOR1 I believe that it is fair and obligatory to help others because I know that other people will help 
me some day 
dropped 
0.8003 
NOR2 I believe that other people will help me when I need help if I share knowledge with others 
through MELANI 
0.8464 
NOR3 I believe that other people will answer my questions regarding specific information and 
knowledge in the future if I share knowledge with others through MELANI 
0.8714 
NOR4 I think that people who are involved with MELANI develop reciprocal beliefs on give and take 
based on other people's intentions and behavior 
0.6946 
      
Executional 
cost 
(Yan et al., 
2016) 
Likert 
scale 
EC1 I cannot seem to find the time to share knowledge in the community 0.6964 
0.7882 EC2 It is laborious to share knowledge in the community 0.6950 EC3 It takes me too much time to share knowledge in the community 0.8626 
EC4 The effort is high for me to share knowledge in the community 0.7913 
      
Reputation 
(Yan et al., 
2016) 
Likert 
scale 
R1 Sharing knowledge can enhance my reputation in the community 0.6312 
0.6996 
R2 I get praises from others by sharing knowledge in the community 0.6890 
R3 I feel that knowledge sharing improves my status in the community 0.7922 
R4 I can earn some feedback or rewards through knowledge sharing that represent my reputation 
and status in the community 
0.7039 
      
Trust 
(Safa & von 
Solms, 2016) 
Likert 
scale 
TR1 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is reliable 0.7510 
0.8598 
TR2 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is effective 0.8688 
TR3 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge mitigates the risk of information 
security breaches 
0.8460 
TR4 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is useful 0.8039 
TR5 I believe that my colleagues would not take advantage of my information security knowledge 
that we share 
dropped 
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Table 2: Final Set of Factor Loadings after Oblique Rotationa 
                
Item Loading on oblimin-rotated factor   
  factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 factor 5 factor 6 factor 7 Commonality 
ISKS1 0.8075       0.27 
ISKS2 0.8903       0.19 
ISKS3 0.885       0.20 
ISKS4 0.86       0.21 
ISKS5 0.6898       0.44 
AT2       0.7751 0.32 
AT3 0.3412      0.6376 0.38 
AT4       0.7849 0.31 
NOR2     0.8464   0.23 
NOR3     0.8714   0.18 
NOR4     0.6946   0.36 
HR1    0.8822    0.16 
HR2    0.8743    0.19 
HR4    0.7499    0.41 
EC1   0.6964     0.49 
EC2   0.695     0.45 
EC3   0.8626     0.21 
EC4   0.7913     0.32 
R1      0.6312  0.49 
R2      0.689  0.51 
R3      0.7922  0.29 
R4      0.7039  0.44 
TR1  0.751      0.36 
TR2  0.8688      0.21 
TR3  0.846      0.26 
TR4  0.8039      0.29 
Eigenvalue 3.786 2.951 2.502 2.329 2.24 2.142 1.851  
Proportion of  
variance explained 14.56% 11.35% 9.62% 8.96% 8.62% 8.24% 7.12%  
Cumulative  
variance explained 14.56% 25.91% 35.53% 44.49% 53.11% 61.34% 68.46%  
         
Notes to Table 2.  
a. Blank cells represent factor loadings smaller than 0.30.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on all Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Frequency 240 2.68 0.78 1 5 
Intensity 228 2.34 1.20 1 7 
Attitude 208 4.10 0.53 3 5 
Reciprocity (social) 195 3.88 0.60 1.66 5 
Reciprocity (transactional) 195 2.16 0.75 1 4 
Executional cost 208 3.14 0.65 1.25 5 
Trust 190 3.82 0.55 1.25 5 
Gender 260 1.04 0.20 1 2 
Age category 261 2.87 0.86 1 4 
Education category 260 2.58 1.25 1 6 
Membership duration 260 7.05 5.35 1 18 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations Among Dependent and Independent Variablesa 
        
               
 Frequency Intensity Attitude 
Reciprocity 
(social) 
Reciprocity 
(transactional) 
Executional 
cost Trust 
Frequency 1       
Intensity 0.3547*** 1      
Attitude 0.2436*** 0.2742*** 1     
Reciprocity (social) 0.2602*** 0.2750*** 0.3798*** 1    
Reciprocity (transactional) 0.1836** 0.0456 -0.0901 0.000 1   
Executional cost -0.2238** -0.1694* -0.0976 -0.0314 0.1533* 1  
Trust 0.2279** -0.0101 0.2471*** 0.0269*** -0.1321 -0.1857*  
       
Notes to Table 4. 
a. Spearman correlations.  *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 5: Final Results of Model Estimationsa,b 
 
  
Intensity of SIS 
(ordered probit 
estimation) 
  Frequency of SIS 
(Tobit estimation) 
 
Coefficient (std. error)   Coefficient (std. error) 
Attitude 0.3627* (0.1672)   0.1895 (0.1111) 
Reciprocity (social) 0.4045** (0.1526)   0.2150* (0.1046) 
Reciprocity (transactional) 0.1860 (0.1118)   0.2361** (0.0816) 
Executional cost -0.4833*** (0.1314)   -0.2336* (0.0962) 
Reputation 0.0932 (0.1895)   -0.1121 (0.1232) 
Trust -0.1847 (0.1501)   0.2964** (0.1036) 
Attitude x Trust -0.6544* (0.2874)   -0.3490 (0.2311) 
Reciprocity (social) x Trust 0.1969 (0.2431)   0.2055 (0.1813) 
Reciprocity (transactional) x Trust -0.4561* (0.2119)   -0.3839** (0.1378) 
Gender -0.2106 (0.4788)   0.1837 (0.1773) 
Age 21-30 -0.1361 (0.4204)   0.2057 (0.2378) 
Age 31-40 0.1139 (0.2293)   0.0051 (0.1513) 
Age 41-50 0.0096 (0.1820)   0.0171 (0.1243) 
Education none -0.7239 (0.6388)   -0.8152** (0.2441) 
Education Master -0.8336 (0.6368)   -0.7984** (0.2671) 
Education Bachelor -0.3198 (0.6202)   -0.7678** (0.2324) 
Education PhD -0.9997 (0.6382)   -0.9345** (0.3181) 
Membership duration 0.0184 (0.0164)   0.0213 (0.0112) 
Government -0.2945 (0.3082)   -0.0097 (0.2288) 
Banking & Finance -0.1515 (0.2472)   0.0304 (0.2064) 
All other industries -0.1576 (0.2982)   -0.3748 (0.2395) 
Energy  -0.1007 (0.3217)   0.1867 (0.2399) 
Health -0.2958 (0.3528)   0.0465 (0.2759) 
     
Constant 
 
  3.0939*** (0.4718) 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -246.50   -197.92 
Pseudo R2 0.0896   0.1564 
F (23 d.f., 165); p > F 
 
  5.25; 0.000*** 
Wald χ2 (23 d.f.); p > χ2 64.02; 0.000***    
Observations 188   188 
    - of which left-censored    10 
    - of which right-censored    1 
 
Notes to Table 5.  
a. Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are given between parentheses. 
    *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
b. Age category “above 50”, education category “other” and the telecommunication/IT 
industry serve as the respective control variable benchmarks. 
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Table 6: Documentation of Pre-Tests 
 
Participant Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Results 
Professor I X  X Adaptation of scales to context 
Professor II  X  Adaptation of scales to context 
PhD student I X   Wording adaptation 
PhD student II  X  Usability improvements 
PhD student III   X 
Implementation of idioms 
explanation and support of the 
study leader 
Professional I X   Questionnaire shortened 
Professional II   X Text field for general comments added 
Industry expert I X   Wording adaptation 
Industry expert II  X X Wording adaptation 
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Abstract  
Empirical studies have analyzed the incentive mechanisms for sharing security information 
between human agents, a key activity for critical infrastructure protection. However, recent 
research shows that most Information Sharing and Analysis Centers do not perform optimally, 
even when properly regulated. Using a meso-level of analysis (i.e. information sharing 
organizations), we close an important research gap by presenting a theoretical framework that 
links institutional economics and security information sharing. We illustrate this framework 
with a dataset collected through an online questionnaire addressed to all critical infrastructures 
(N=262) operating at a Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security. Using 
descriptive statistics, we investigate how institutional rules offer human agents an institutional 
freedom to self-design an efficient security information sharing artifact. Our results show that 
a properly designed artifact can positively reinforces human agents to share security 
information and find the right balance between three governance models: (a) public–private 
partnership, (b) private, and (c) government- based. Overall, our work lends support to a better 
institutional design of security information sharing and the formulation of policies that can 
avoid non-cooperative and free-riding behaviors that plague cybersecurity. 
 
Keywords: economics of information security; security information sharing; new institutional 
economics; information sharing and analysis center; critical infrastructure protection; 
information assurance. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, critical infrastructures (CIs) have grown more dependent on Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and the Internet network to operate properly 
(Eden et al., 2015). Therefore, the cybersecurity of CIs is increasingly recognized as a public 
good that is essential in the daily life of human agents, organizations, and governments 
(Mermoud, Keupp, Ghernaouti, & Percia David, 2016). The need for managing critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) is of vital importance for national security because cascading 
effects caused by mutual dependencies across different CIs and their services are considered 
to be a systemic risk (E. Luiijf, Nieuwenhuijs, Klaver, Eeten, & Cruz, 2008; Percia David, 
Keupp, Ghernaouti, & Mermoud, 2016; van Eeten, Nieuwenhuijs, Luiijf, Klaver, & Cruz, 
2011). 
Previous research has shown that security information sharing (SIS)1 is a key activity for 
producing information security for CIP (Laube & Böhme, 2016; E. Luiijf & Klaver, 2015). SIS 
is widely acknowledged by policy-makers and industrial actors, as it can reduce risks, deter 
attacks, and enhance the overall resilience of CIs (Laube & Böhme, 2017). For the last two 
decades, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) have been the preferred way for 
CIs to organize and coordinate SIS.2 Even though no empirical evidences demonstrate the link 
between the SIS activity and an observed enhancement of information security, most scholars 
and practitioners are convinced that such an activity contributes to foster cybersecurity and 
social welfare as a whole (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2015; Laube & Böhme, 2016). 
Although empirical studies have investigated the incentive mechanisms that support 
voluntary SIS at a micro-level (i.e., between human agents), most ISACs do not perform at 
their theoretical Pareto-optimal level, 3  even when properly regulated (Mermoud, Keupp, 
Huguenin, Palmié, & Percia David, 2018). This leads to the following research question: What 
are the most efficient institutional rules for designing a SIS artifact? To the best of our 
knowledge, no scientific study has investigated this aspect. To address it, we propose a set of 
institutional rules for the design of efficient SIS artifacts at a meso-level, i.e., a theoretically 
                                               
1  
 
 
2 ISACs are non-profit organizations that provide a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats 
by providing a two-way sharing process, often involving both the private and the public sector. 
3 Pareto efficiency describes a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to 
make any human agent better off without making at least one human agent worse off. 
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“ideal” SIS center. Using descriptive statistics from a primary set of field-data, we present three 
generalizable SIS governance models, thus suggesting how human agents would self-organize 
SIS if these particular rules are implemented. 
The remainder of this part is structured as follows: In Section 2, we survey related work 
and connect different streams of economic theories in order to generate a novel theoretical 
framework. In Section 3, we conceptualize a set of institutional rules linked to an SIS artifact. 
We document our population and how the dataset was collected, Section 4. And in Section 5, 
we present descriptive statistics illustrating our framework in the context of CIP. We present 
concluding remarks, limitations and future work are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Related Work 
This part is premised on the belief that a computer security-based approach, although necessary, 
is not sufficient to handle the information security issues of CIs. Therefore, in this section, we 
connect different streams of theories from institutional economics and security of information 
systems in order to create a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework. 
 
2.1 An Institutional Economics Perspective of SIS 
The driving forces leading to the creation of the ISAC differ; in some cases, the private sector 
takes the lead, whereas in others, the public sector brings all stakeholders together.4 In both 
cases, it is crucial for the ISAC to find the right balance of collaboration between the public 
and private sectors, usually formalized into a public–private partnership (PPP)5  (ENISA, 
2018a). Our research is premised on the idea that ISACs are institutions that were not designed 
in the most efficient way, because they were historically initiated and regulated by 
governments, which are more focused on complying to security principles, rather than on 
ensuring a security efficiency (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2013). 
                                               
4 Some EU legislation nourishes the existing ISACs and the creation of new ones. For example, in December 
2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, adopting 
the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) aims to harmonize and unify existing EU privacy-breach reporting obligations. On the other hand, 
some regulations, such as the US Freedom of Information Act might represent a barrier to SIS. 
5 A PPP is a cooperation between two or more private and public sectors. In this study, we do not differentiate 
whether the public or the private sector are owning and/or managing the PPP. 
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From an organizational-theory perspective, ISACs perform differently as they operate 
under different institutional rules (ENISA, 2018a). With each industry or government being 
free to set up their ISAC, these sharing institutions widely differ in quality, structure, and in 
how they are funded, managed and operated (ENISA, 2015; Prieto, 2006). Consequently, by 
applying an economic perspective on ISACs, it is possible to understand the quality, 
performance and problems of a particular institution. An institutional economic analysis can 
reveal why human agents behave differently depending on how the sharing institution is 
designed. This can explain why suboptimal performance appears to be pervasive, even in the 
next generation of ISACs, for instance in Information Sharing and Analysis Organization 
(ISAOs) or so-called “fusion centers” (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2015, 2016; Weiss, 
2015), which are supposed to aggregate and manage the flow of information across all levels 
and sectors. To address this problem, we propose a set of institutional rules for the design of 
efficient SIS artifacts, i.e., a theoretically “ideal” SIS center designed at a meso-level, i.e. a 
level of analysis that falls between the micro- and macro-levels, such as a community or an 
organization. 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature offers insights on how legal norms and 
rules (i.e., institutions) underlie an economic activity, such as SIS (Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 
2002). The NIE theory describes how rules affect human behavior, as institutions have different 
political, economic and social conditions (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Richter, 2015). 
Institutions set the rules on how an economic system works and create incentives and threats 
to orient human agents’ actions such as for SIS (Bauer & van Eeten, 2009). Thus, human agents 
cannot be expected to voluntarily engage in SIS, unless they are provided with a safe and 
conducive institutional design that facilitates SIS (Mermoud et al., 2018). As a result, the 
decisive criteria for SIS performance are not related to funding or regulations, but rather to the 
design of “good” institutions. As there is an ongoing global debate about whether SIS should 
be mandatory, our research contributes to the formulation of policies based on voluntary SIS 
that can avoid non-cooperative and free-riding behaviors that plague cybersecurity (Luiijf & 
Kernkamp, 2015). 
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3. Research Artifact and Set of Rules 
In this section, we develop an SIS artifact based on a set of institutional rules. 
 
3.1 Institutional Design of an SIS Artifact 
Design science research (DSR) focuses on the creation, development and performance 
evaluation of artifacts typically including research models, algorithms, knowledge and human-
computer interfaces (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). We use the DSR theory to conceptualize our 
SIS artifact as a generic information center which is not necessarily related to ISACs as such. 
In our study, we use the NIE methodology to design a theoretical “ideal” SIS artifact with the 
intention of improving the functional performance iteratively. Figure 1 presents nine 
institutional rules which can generate institutional incentives for SIS. Depending on how the 
rules are implemented, the performance and governance models will differ, because human 
agents can self-organize SIS and select the right balance of partnership between the public and 
private sector. The lack of cooperation between the public and private sector remains a major 
pitfall for SIS and the global security (Prieto, 2006), especially in a “post-Snowden” context 
where trust has been broken. 
 
3.2 Set of Universal Rules for SIS 
Using a free-market economy approach, we suggest that, if human agents can self-design an 
SIS artifact, the market will select the best model on the long run (Hayek, 2005). Previous 
research suggests that nine universal institutional rules are particularly relevant for a design-
efficient SIS artifact (ENISA, 2018a, 2018b): 
1. Investment / sharing freedom guarantees that participation in SIS is voluntary and not 
forced by any regulations and/or constraints. Participants can determine what they share 
and are allowed to leave the artifact at any time. 
2. SIS security is guaranteed that the artifact is built, managed and audited with the 
highest cybersecurity standards. An application programming interface (API) should 
be designed to enable tokenization, i.e. substituting a sensitive data element with a non-
sensitive equivalent. This process should facilitate a secured SIS process and meet the 
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security requirements of US and EU regulators (e.g., regarding sensitive customer 
data).  
3. SIS privacy is guaranteed by the participants' ability to seclude themselves, or 
information about themselves, thus engaging in SIS selectively. Therefore, participants 
can access, modify and delete their (meta)data at any time and have a right to be 
forgotten. Participants can determine with whom they share security information 
according to the circle theory (e.g., participants can choose to share information only 
with the government or only with their industry) (Mermoud et al., 2016). Upon request, 
the (meta)data can be anonymized in order to protect the participants' identities. The 
data will not be used for other purposes than producing information security.  
4. A trust mechanism process is implemented in order to build trust among participants 
(e.g., with workshops or events). Trust can also be built on existing relationships or 
collaborations.  
5. Information exclusivity is a rule that ensures that the shared information is timely, 
relevant, actionable and exclusive, thus making the artifact more attractive for 
participants.  
6. Financial rewards are organized in order to motivate participants with a financial 
reward mechanism that recognizes their involvement in the SIS activity.  
7. Social rewards are organized in order to motivate participants with a reciprocal altruism 
mechanism. As in the tit-for-tat strategy, evolutionary biology defines reciprocal 
altruism as a behavior where an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its 
fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, with the expectation that the other 
organism will act in a similar manner, and eventually increase its own fitness.  
8. Cooperation is implemented by altruistic punishment mechanisms and is measured by 
the frequency and intensity of the SIS activity. Such a cooperation is triggered by the 
intention to engage in the SIS activity, which was triggered by the belief that the SIS 
activity is performing in terms of information security.  
9. Institutional design (ID) guarantees that the most efficient rules are implemented, 
audited and controlled iteratively. Participants should be able to choose their 
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organizational and governance standards, for instance between: 9a) centralized sharing 
model such as a relational database (e.g., a forum) and 9b) decentralized sharing model 
such as a distributed database (e.g., a blockchain). This rule is also defined by 9c) 
formalization and 9d) standardization. Formalization is the extent to which work roles 
are structured in an organization, and the activities of the participants are governed by 
rules and procedures. Standardization is the process of implementing and developing 
technical standards based on the consensus of different parties. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Information Sharing Artifact 
This figure describes a set of institutional rules that offer human agents an institutional 
freedom to design an efficient SIS artifact. The artifact positively reinforces human agents to 
share security information in three generic governance models; (a) public–private 
partnership, (b) private, and (c) government-based. 
 
4. Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection 
In this section, we present how our data set was collected and three different generic 
governance models that can be applied to CIP. 
 
4.1 Population and Data Collection 
We conducted our study with the Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information 
Security (MELANI). The center was created in 2005 as PPP between the federal government 
and the private industry. It operates an ISAC (MELANI-Net) that brings together over 150 CI 
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operators from all sectors in Switzerland. The questionnaire6 was sent to the 424 participants 
of that closed SIS user group. These human agents freely decide whether to share information, 
such that their individual behavior also determines the behavior of the CIs they represent. The 
closed user group comprises senior managers from diverse industries; all are in charge of 
providing cybersecurity for their respective firms. 
Data collection began on October 12, 2017 and finished on December 1, 2017. Two reminders 
were sent on October 26 and November 9, 2017. When data collection ended, 262 responses 
had been collected, of which 189 fully completed questionnaires (72%). Overall, the survey 
response rate was 63%. 
 
4.2 Possible Governance Models for SIS 
We posit that human agents – positively reinforced by institutional rules – will self-organize 
for SIS and find the right balance between three main generic SIS governance models based 
on previous studies (ENISA, 2016, 2018a): 
A) The public–private partnership model typically brings together cybersecurity 
stakeholders to organize SIS. Therefore, a strong cooperation between CIs and 
governments is needed in order to address cybersecurity issues. In this model, trust is 
hard to achieve, because of the high cultural heterogeneity. This governance model is 
the result of a mixed economy, i.e., a system bringing together elements of free market 
and planned economies. The government often has a role of facilitator but is not the 
driving force behind the governance model. 
B) The private industry model is typically a sector-specific model focusing on organizing 
SIS for CIs within the same sector, in order to generate sectorial knowledge and trend 
analysis. This governance model is likely to be joined by highly competitive 
international industries, such as banking and finance or air transport. This governance 
model is the result of a market economy, because the driving force is the private 
industry. 
                                               
6 The full questionnaire with items and scales is to be found in the appendix or can be downloaded at the 
following address https://drive.switch.ch/index.php/s/DgYt2lWZcgVSyMP 
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C) The government model is typically a country-centered approach focusing on gathering 
public CIs and cybersecurity agencies, such as governmental computer emergency 
response team (CERTs). This governance model is often funded by government 
subsidies where participation is either mandatory or voluntary for both public and 
private CIs (e.g., mandates stemming from EU directives, such as breach reporting 
mentioned at the art. 13a of the Telecom Law). This governance model is usually the 
result of a planned economy, because the driving force is the government. 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we present descriptive statistics illustrating an application of our framework in 
the context of CIP. Using the collected field-data, we investigated correlations between 
governance model preferences and institutional rules. We extended our pre-analysis to four 
other control variables in order complement the preferences analysis: Organization size, 
participations in trust building events, and sector of activity. 
 
5.1 Correlations between Institutional Rules and Governance Model Preferences 
Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients between the governance model preferences and the 
nine rules measured at a micro-level. These latter are represented by proxies that have been 
gathered through specific psychometric questions. 7  Our results show relatively low 
correlations between pre-established institutional rules and human agents’ preferences for 
respective generic governance models, namely PPP-, private-, or government- ISACs. 
Moreover, only a few correlations (seven out of thirty-six) are statistically significant. 
Concerning the following rules, namely: 2) Security, 4) Trust, 5) Information exclusivity, PPP 
are preferred (positive signs). Yet, despite statistically significant results, those correlation 
coefficients remain at low levels. However, rule 8) Cooperation is highly statistically 
significant for the PPP preference, despite remaining at a relatively low level as well. This rule 
also shows a statistically significant correlation coefficient for the Private model preference, 
but also remains at a low level. Rule 3) Privacy is interestingly showing a negative and 
                                               
7 t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were performed in order to analyze the differences and statistical 
significance among group means. The detail of those analysis and proxies selection are available upon request 
from the corresponding author. 
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statistically significant correlation between the Government model and the Privacy rule. 
Despite an also low level, it instinctively indicates trust suspicions between human agents and 
the government. Due to the correlation coefficients low levels, and the general lack of 
statistically significant results, at this stage, no direct link between institutional rules and 
preferred generic governance models can be deducted. Therefore, future work on what defines 
governance model preferences is needed at the meso-level. 
 
Set of universal rules for SIS  (a) PPP  (b) Private  (c) Government  
1) Investment/sharing freedom (Q7)  -0.09 -0.02 0.06 
2) Security (Q15) 0.15* -0.00 -0.03 
3) Privacy (Q95) 0.10 0.01 -0.15* 
4) Trust (Q16) 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 
5) Information exclusivity (Q17)  0.15* 0.05 0.03 
6) Financial rewards (Q48)  -0.02 -0.01 0.05 
7) Social rewards (Q51)  0.11 0.05 -0.02 
8) Cooperation (Q54)  0.26*** 0.15 0.03 
9a) ID: centralization (Q56)  0.08 0.00 -0.02 
9b) ID: decentralization (Q57)  0.06 0.00*** 0.12 
9c) ID: formalization (Q58)  0.09 0.10 0.00 
9d) ID: standardization (Q59)  -0.10 0.06 0.01 
Table 1: Governance Model Preferences for Security Information Sharing 
This table shows the governance model preferences (N1=137) correlated with a set of rules 
measured at a micro-level, represented by proxies that have been gathered through specific 
psychometric questions. Each response score was measured on a scale anchored at 1 (lowest 
score, e.g., “never”, “not content at all”) to 5 (highest score, e.g. “always”, “highly 
content”). Hence, the larger the score in the table, the greater the satisfaction or involvement 
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with the specific governance model. For corresponding significance levels: *p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.2 Governance Model Preferences by Organization Size 
Fig. 2 shows the governance model preferences (N2=260) related to the organization size. This 
confirms that PPP-based and private-based governance models are generally preferred. 
Overall, private-based and PPP-based governance models are preferred. Large organizations 
(>250 employees) slightly prefer private-based and PPP-based governance models. Such a 
result can be explained by the fact that larger organizations are likely to be international 
organizations that are more subject to experiencing more competitive environment, thus are 
more familiar with a free market setup. As such a setup has the tendency of obeying fewer 
regulations, a private-based governance model would be a better fit for them. According to 
their experience, most participants perceive the number of participants in their closed circle to 
be optimal (45%) and sometimes too large (24%) or too small (31%). 
 
 
Figure 2: Governance Model Preferences by Organization Size 
This figure shows governance model preferences (N2=260) related to the organization size 
measured by the number of employees. Each response score was measured on a scale from 1 
(lowest score, e.g., “strongly disagree”) to 5 (highest score, e.g., “strongly agree”). 
 
5.3 Governance Model Preferences by Participation in Trust Building Events 
We measured the governance model preferences (Nfa=260) related to the participation in trust 
building events, such as workshops. Each response score was measured on a dichotomous scale 
anchored at 1 (“Yes”) to 2 (“No”). Our results show no clear differences between governance 
model preferences between operators who have participated in workshops and those who have 
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not. However, participating in such events helps build trust among operators. The slight 
preference for private-based governance models of operators who have participated in 
workshops (3.75) with respect to those who have not (3.51) might be explained by this 
participation in trust building events. They might prefer privately-based SIS or in PPPs (3.70), 
instead of government-based SIS (2.88) as the trust they create among themselves is not 
directly related to the government. This shows, however, that the government is important for 
creating initial trust and setting the rules for a conducive environment for the SIS activity. 
 
5.4 Governance Model Preferences by Sector of Activity 
Figure 3 shows sector-wide governance model preferences trends. Surprisingly, among the 
administration population (N3=36), private-based and PPP-based governance models are 
preferred over the government-based models. PPP-based models is the most preferred option, 
and the private-based option is not far behind. Such statistics are relevant as the administration 
is part of the government. This can be explained by the fact that the information-security 
expertise of the private sector is an attribute that administrators are keen to take advantage of 
by sharing the knowledge between the private industry and the government. Among those in 
the banking and finance population (N4=57), private-based and PPP- based governance models 
are also preferred with respect to government-based models. Such statistics are not surprising 
as the banking and finance sector is highly competitive and obeys to a free-market setup. 
Moreover, a government- based option is the least preferred, corroborating the idea that less 
regulation is better for that specific sector. In the transport and logistic sector (N5=7), the PPP 
governance model is the preferred one, probably because this specific industry has a long 
history of collaboration between the private and public sector. Furthermore, this sector is 
predominantly composed of fully state-owned limited companies regulated by public law. 
Further research could investigate the relationship between shareholding and governance 
model preferences, in order to develop sector-wide tailored policy options. 
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Figure 3: Governance Model Preferences by Sectors 
This figure shows sector-wide governance model preferences trends. Each response score 
was measured on a scale anchored at 1 (lowest score, e.g., “strongly disagree” to 5 (highest 
score, e.g., “strongly agree”). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks, Limitations and Future Work 
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first study linking institutional rules with a 
conducive environment that could foster SIS at a meso-level. Using descriptive statistics from 
a primary set of field-data, we have presented three preferences generic SIS governance models, 
suggesting how human agents could self-organize SIS if these particular rules are implemented. 
Our results suggest that a properly designed artifact may positively reinforces human agents to 
share security information and find the right balance between three governance models. Overall, 
our work lends support to a better institutional design of SIS and the formulation of policies 
that can avoid non-cooperative and free-riding behaviors that plague cybersecurity. 
This study has some limitations. First, we recognize socioeconomic biases, such as an 
overrepresentation of male respondents. Second, in some cases we note a tension between the 
micro-level measurements and some analysis performed at a meso-level. However, the analysis 
of those two distinct levels is meticulously distinguished. Even though respondents’ answers 
are measured at a micro-level, their preferences shed some light on their meso-level preferences. 
Our research could be extended in several ways. First, our model could be generalized to 
other contexts, for instance, cross-border information sharing among intelligence agencies, 
which remains a major pitfall for fusion centers established after the 9/11 attacks [22]. As the 
presented rules are universal, they could probably be implemented in other cultures and 
contexts, for instance, in information exchanges between tax authorities. Second, engaging in 
the SIS economy is not only a matter of incentives and institutional design. As SIS is a human 
activity (even when partially automatized) that takes place only if it is perceived as effective 
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by those who are likely to implement it. A positive performance perception that SIS can bring 
to information security is thus a sine qua non condition for engaging in SIS. Such a motivational 
approach could in fine also support the information security of CIs. 
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In this dissertation, I have explored several research questions, published as three independent 
articles. Although the three parts of this thesis have their own conclusions, here, I summarize 
my main contributions and results, limitations and critical reflections, as well as leads for future 
work. 
 
1. Main Contributions 
For over forty years, economists have analyzed information sharing between organizations, 
most of the time with the involvement of proxies (e.g., trade associations) (Gal-Or & Ghose, 
2005). About twenty years ago, these “old” models were taken up by security economics when 
information security emerged as a new application domain for economic reasoning (Böhme, 
2016; Garrido-Pelaz, Gozalez-Manzano, & Pastrana, 2016). Today, extensive scientific 
literature confirms that SIS among human agents who operate information systems is 
conducive for improving the cybersecurity of these systems (Laube & Böhme, 2017). 
Empirical analysis, however, shows that “sharing centers” (such as ISACs) do not always work 
optimally (Murdoch & Leaver, 2015).  
 In order to improve SIS, the technical literature usually focuses on the identification of the 
correct exchange format, on data models or on the adoption of the right technology (Burger, 
Goodman, Kampanakis, & Zhu, 2014) or sharing conventions, such as the Traffic Light 
Protocol.1 This approach neglects the fact that SIS is a human activity, hence people need 
incentives to properly use it. My behavioral approach extends the SIS literature with several 
contributions on the human factor in SIS (Mermoud, Keupp, Ghernaouti, & Percia David, 2016; 
Mermoud, Keupp, Huguenin, Palmié, & Percia David, 2018; Mermoud, Keupp, & Percia 
David, 2018); they are provided in three different, but complementary parts listed below. 
 
1.1 Results Synthesis Part I: Theoretical Framework 
My first goal was to provide a novel theoretical framework that – based on a thorough literature 
review – links SIS and selected incentives. SIS is a relatively low-cost and uncomplicated way 
to give defenders an advantage over attackers, in a context where cybersecurity can be reduced 
                                               
1 The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) was created in the early 2000s by the UK Government's National Infrastructure 
Security Coordination Centre to encourage greater sharing of sensitive information between individuals and 
organizations in a trusted and controlled way. Source: https://www.cpni.gov.uk/ (retrieved 13.03.2019) 
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to an arms race for information. However, SIS is a human activity which is fragile. Its biggest 
obstacles are not a lack of technology to facilitate information exchange, but economic 
(dis)incentives. Therefore, in order to better understand the determinants and barriers to SIS, I 
developed a first theoretical incentive-based and human-centric SIS system model that is based 
on five propositions which are operationalized into hypothesis in Part II. 
 
1.2 Results Synthesis Part II: Empirical Analysis 
My second goal was to operationalize the theory developed in Part I and empirically test my 
hypotheses, using a psychometric questionnaire answered by 262 firms (with a response rate 
of 63% of the 424 asked) participating in a Swiss ISAC. The research hypotheses are (1) that 
sharing has to be reciprocated; (2) that valuable information should be obtained; (3) that there 
would be low executional costs; (4) there would be a positive effect on reputation; and (5) that 
sharers would trust each other. Hypothesis 4 was not supported; (1) and (3) were supported 
strongly, and (2) and (5) were supported to some extent. 
 
1.3 Results Synthesis Part III: Policy Recommendations 
My third goal was to formulate policy recommendations that could avoid the non-cooperative 
and free-riding behaviors that plague SIS. The preferred governance model for SIS is a public–
private partnership. Our results also suggest that a properly designed artifact can positively 
reinforce human agents and encourage them to voluntarily share security information, even in 
a world where SIS tends to become mandatory through specific regulations (GDPR, NIS 
directive, CISA, etc.). 
 
2. Limitations and Critical Reflections 
Although the three parts of this thesis have their own discussion section, here, I summarize the 
main overall limitations of the thesis. The three articles in this dissertation are all published or 
under revision and hence stand as they were published or submitted. This implies that published 
text cannot be changed, but now as I stand at the end of my dissertation process, some critical 
reflection that encompasses the entire manuscript is adequate. To this purpose this section is 
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detailed into various points with no particular order that each address an important issue that 
should be considered in the context with what was published. 
 An important limitation is that the data collected for this research are cross-sectional, not 
longitudinal, and hence I can only claim association, but not causation. The thesis manuscript 
was completely revised after the private defense with this limitation in mind, and any instances 
that might be interpreted as over-claiming have been removed in the revised version. Instead 
of such over-claiming, I have now provided more paths for future research whereby future 
work can refute or corroborate the associations I identify. 
 In Part I, I attempted to construct a theoretical model on the basis of pure theory and 
illustration alone. As I attempted to operationalize this model for empirical testing, I researched 
the empirical literature to identify measures by which I could operationalize my theoretical 
constructs. This created a problem that theoretical labels not intended by the authors of this 
measurement were ascribed to them. For example, the scale “attitude” as published by Safa 
and von Solms (2016) was used with the label “value” in Part II. Also, what Yan et al. (2016) 
termed “executional costs” I interpreted as “institutional barriers”. I did so in an attempt to 
align the theoretical model I had constructed in Part I with measurement literature. However, I 
found that these ascribed levels complicated theory development in Part II and upon due 
criticism, I decided to use the empirical measures as they were published and reframed from 
using any ascribed level from my side. This led to a more substantial and profound theoretical 
foundation of the hypothesis and also prevented inaccurate claims. 
 As a result, Part II features empirical constructs as they were published under their original 
name. In this sense, Part I and II are inconsistent in that Part II provides a stronger and better 
substantiated theoretical model that is also aligned with the empirical literature. Thus, the 
development of Part I to Part II illustrates the learning process as I advanced my knowledge in 
behavioral economics, behavioral psychology and research methods. 
 My dissertation is not a game theoretic piece and hence it does not contribute to analyzing 
externalities of SIS. In this respect, the introduction of Part I overstates what I can find in my 
analysis. What I do find however is that human behavior is significantly associated with SIS, 
which is the more fundamental problem with the current underutilization of SIS. Therefore, it 
seems to be a lack of focus on the human factor in SIS. As all externalities ultimately reside in 
human behavior, the understanding of free-riding and underutilization requires a prior 
understanding of human behavior. 
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 In this sense, my dissertation provides a very first step towards a deeper understanding of 
the economic effects of SIS. More research is required to further explore how human behavior 
and SIS outcomes are related ideally by longitudinal approaches which can infer causal 
relationships and hence bridge the gap between game theoretic work and empirical 
measurement. 
 
3. Discussion on Policy Recommendations and ISAC organization 
By the research design I use, my dissertation does not study reasons why humans would not 
share information. However, it does inform the reader about which behavior and why is 
associated with SIS. This implies the question of whether or not an individual shares 
information is more related to the expectation that the individual has for any particular 
exchange relationship. The empirical results I find in Part II suggest that if the focal individual 
has trust a positive attitude and expectations will be reciprocated, that individual is likely to 
share knowledge and to react to information provided by others. Future research should hence 
enquire into the behavioral causes of the non-sharing of information considering the extent to 
which any individual poses information that can be shared (if any). 
 Overall, this PhD thesis provides some food for thoughts regarding the future of SIS. 
ISACs as we know them today are inherited from the past. For the future, it will be important 
to mitigate this path dependence and investigate about alternative “information sharing” 
institutions, which are responsive to human behavior by design. Since human behavior is 
significantly associated with SIS, information sharing organizations must follow human 
behavior. If the SIS institution is not aligned with human behavior, this institution will not 
perform well. This touches fundamental aspects of human organizations, which could be 
theoretically investigated and empirically tested in future work. 
 My dissertation, in particular Part III, gives some hints of what respondents in my sample 
think is a conducive environment for SIS and what is not a “good” organization for SIS. 
Particularly the strong negative correlation I find with the “executional costs” suggest that 
mandatory sharing is probably not as productive as trying to motivate human agents to 
cooperate voluntarily. 
 In the future, alternative ISAC configuration or similar “information sharing institution” 
could emerge. For instance, an ISAC could be organized according to the private-collective 
innovation model by von Hippel & von Krogh (2003), i.e. by “crowdsourcing” intelligence 
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from a larger open source community. That way of organizing would be “something in the 
middle” between state and private ISAC organization, hence could constitute an alternative 
way of ISAC organization that Part III does not consider. Section 3.2 describes an example of 
how the future of automated SIS could look like. 
 
4. Outlook 
This dissertation opens multiple research opportunities for future work. First, I present two 
research works (in-progress) that are built on the findings of this dissertation. Second, I 
investigate new research opportunities based on (meta)data generated by recent SIS regulations. 
 
4.1 The Influence of Agent Behavior on the Perceived Performance of SIS (submitted) 
This research project extends the findings in this dissertation by focusing on the perceived 
performance of SIS, arguing that the extent to which a human agent engages in SIS is a function 
of their individual performance expectation, i.e., of the net benefit they expect as a result of 
engaging in SIS. Combining theory with opportunistic action and altruistic punishment, we 
provide empirical analysis predictors of the perceived performance of SIS. Our results suggest 
that the frequency of sharing transactions, the perceived utility of resource allocation, 
reciprocity expectations, and trust have a significant effect on the formation of the perceived 
performance of SIS. These findings point to several opportunities to motivate human agents to 
show cooperative behavior. This journal article was accepted (major revisions) in Computers 
in Human Behavior2 on the 3rd of January 2019. We are currently revising it and will resubmit 
it on the 15th of May, 2019: 
• Percia David, D., Keupp, M. M., Mermoud, A. (2019). Opportunism is Not Enough: 
The Influence of Agent Behavior on the Perceived Performance of Security 
Information Sharing. Computers in Human Behavior. 
 
4.2 Setting the Optimal Size of SIS Groups (work-in-progress) 
This project is work in-progress explores a neglected area of SIS, specifically the optimal size 
of SIS groups. Based on the findings of this dissertation, our research group is extending our 
                                               
2 https://www.journals.elsevier.com/computers-in-human-behavior (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
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results by revisiting the Olson’s Paradox (Dejean, Pénard, & Suire, 2010) with empirical 
analysis on the optimal SIS group size among different industries and sectors, in order to 
furnish tailor-made optimization recommendations according to the environment 
specifications (i.e., different industries and thus different sharing cultures). Findings could 
point to several optimization opportunities related to the optimal size of SIS platforms, and 
ultimately foster the performance of the SIS activity. 
Practitioners’ experiences suggest that the performance of SIS platforms does not grow 
linearly with the number of participants. If the shortage of members leads to a weak SIS activity, 
too many members seems to lead to the same result, due to the lack of trust between participants 
(inverted U-curve due to oversharing effects). We propose to empirically investigate the 
influence of the SIS platform size (i.e., the number of members) on the performance of the SIS 
activity itself (measured by the number of shared cyber incidents/cyber, threats in a given SIS 
platform). To the best of our knowledge, this relationship has never been investigated. Future 
results could be of interest for both academics and practitioners, as it could shed some light on 
how to set institutional rules for avoiding congestion, thus enhance and even maximize the SIS 
performance.  
Hypotheses will be tested by using a new dataset from the Open Threat Exchange Platform 
(OTX), 3  the world's largest crowd-sourced computer-security platform with over 80’000 
participants who share on average, about 19 million daily cyber threats. 
 
Figure 1: The Open Source OTX Platform Allows the Creation of ISAC-Like Groups 
Since 2016, the OTX platform has enabled participants to create private communities and 
discussions groups in order to share information about cyber threats. Organizations can 
create their own sector wide "ISAC-like groups" at very little cost, without the administrative 
burden and institutional barriers associated with “official” ISACs. Source: 
https://www.alienvault.com 
                                               
3 https://otx.alienvault.com/ (retrieved 05.11.2018) 
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This platform, acquired in August 2018 by AT&T, is already partially automated and 
enables interoperability through APIs, as well as the integration of natural language processing 
and machine learning. The automation of SIS also has the advantage of eliminating or reducing 
inappropriate human behaviors. In recent years, other private initiatives have come to fill the 
shortcomings of the ISACs, often considered too slow and too bureaucratic by practioners.  
For instance, Facebook4 and IBM5 have launched similar threat exchange platforms in 
recent years. Empirical analysis based on data provided by such platforms could point to 
several optimization opportunities related to the optimal size of SIS platforms, and ultimately 
foster the performance of the SIS activity. These findings could be corroborated or falsified by 
a second phase consisting of setting a lab experiment in order to train and evaluate a classifier. 
Further research could also use data from SIEM software, such as log files that offer real-time 
analysis of security alerts, correlation of events, and audit trail. Future results could point to 
several optimization opportunities related to the optimal size of SIS platforms and aimed at 
fostering the performance of the SIS activity. This work will be submitted to the 2019 
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 19),6  to be held at Harvard 
University: 
• Percia David, D., Keupp, M. M., Mermoud, A. (2019). Size Does Matter: Setting the 
Optimal Size of Security Information Sharing Platforms for Fostering Cybersecurity – 
An Empirical Analysis. 
 
4.3 Empirical Analysis of Mandatory SIS with Authorities (work-in-progress) 
As regulators will likely implement new laws to encourage SIS in the future, it would be 
interesting to empirically analyze the (meta)data generated by the laws intended to foster SIS. 
For instance, researchers could collaborate with authorities in the EU member states that are 
already engaged in SIS through article 33 of the GDPR.7 In the US and the EU, other major 
regulatory efforts are underway to strengthen information sharing.  
                                               
4 https://developers.facebook.com/programs/threatexchange/ (retrieved 05.11.2018) 
5 https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/ (retrieved 05.11.2018) 
6 https://weis2019.econinfosec.org (retrieved on 28.10.2018) 
7 http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/33.htm (retrieved 01.11.2018) 
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In Switzerland, following the recent adoption of the National Strategy for Switzerland’s 
protection against cyber risks (NCS),8 the Federal Council has begun to work on regulations 
that would make SIS partially mandatory. In the summer of 2019, a formal decision will be 
taken for the regulation of SIS in Switzerland.9 Economic analysis will be very much needed 
to shed light onto the effectiveness of such laws, as our current policy recommendations 
support the view that the effectiveness of mandatory security-breach reporting to authorities is 
probably limited. Further interdisciplinary research (at the frontier of law and economics) could 
also explore the privacy / utility trade-off of SIS with authorities, in order to expand the 
(security) information sharing economics literature. 
 
  
                                               
8 https://www.isb.admin.ch/isb/en/home/ikt-vorgaben/strategien-teilstrategien/sn002-
nationale_strategie_schutz_schweiz_cyber-risiken_ncs.html (retrieved 01.11.2018) 
9 https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20183562 (retrieved 01.11.2018) 
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2. Online Questionnaire  
 
07/12/2017 Last page
https://www.selectsurvey.ethz.ch/Print.aspx?SurveyID=78L24661&Title=Y&Breaks=N&AllPages=Y&Pages= 1/10
  
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
This study is endorsed by :
 
   
  You can verify the authenticity of this study and the identity of the authors on the official website of their institutions
 
Pascal Lamia (Swiss Confederation)
 Marcus Matthias Keupp (Military Academy at ETH Zurich)
 Alain Mermoud (Military Academy at ETH Zurich)
 
Or by calling MELANI +4158 46 34506
   
  Dear member of the MELANI closed circle,
 Sehr geehrte Mitglieder des "Geschlossenen Kundenkreises" (GK),
 Chers membres du cercle fermé,
 
We are doing a research study in the domain of human aspects of security information sharing in organisations. We
would  like to understand your  incentives and barriers to cybersecurity­relevant  information sharing with the Swiss
Reporting and Analysis Centre  for  Information Assurance  (MELANI). Your  responses will  be extremely valuable  to
build a safer and more resilient Cyberspace. Please find below some information on:
The authors
 ­ This survey is being conducted by the military academy at ETH Zurich with the support of MELANI
 ­ Data collection is led by PD Dr. Marcus M. Keupp and his assistant Alain Mermoud, who is a PhD candidate at the
University of Lausanne
The data
 ­ All your responses are collected in Switzerland and treated strictly anonymously
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­ The collected data will be deleted after all analyses have been performed
 ­ This survey is purely academic and has no financial or business­related interest
Your reward
 ­ You will receive a free study which will support your organisation in the security information sharing process
 ­ Upon  request, you will  be delivered with a precise picture of how your organisation compares  to others.  If  you
decide to receive this reward, only your e­mail address will be disclosed to the study leader.
 
The questionnaire
 ­  The  template  is  responsive,  but  we  strongly  recommend  to  answer  the  survey  on  a  desktop  or  laptop  with  a
trustworthy Internet connection
 ­ The questionnaire takes about 15­20 minutes to complete
­ The questionnaire is only available in English, but the study leader can support you in French and German
 ­ Please direct any questions directly to alain.mermoud@milak.ethz.ch or +4158 484 82 99
Definition and scope
 ­  Security  information  sharing  is  an  activity  consisting  of  sharing  cybersecurity­relevant  information  between
cybersecurity  stakeholders. For  the sake of brevity, we will  refer  to  this activity as  “security  information sharing”
(SIS) throughout the questionnaire
­ Organisations typically exchange information on vulnerabilities, phishing, malware, and data breaches, as well as
threat intelligence, best practices, early warnings, and expert advices and insights (Luiijf & Klaver, 2015)
­ Please note that this study attempts to capture your SIS activities with MELANI only. Please ignore other SIS
activities, such as SIS with other Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) or bilateral SIS
 ­ The unit of analysis is yourself. Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences, and not
on behalf of your organisation!
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Controls
Control variables are necessary to eliminate distortions.
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences, and not on behalf of
your organisation!
   
1. 
 
Gender*
 
 
Male   Female  
Other, please specify
     
    
2. 
 
What is your mother tongue?*
 
 
German   French   English   Italian  
Other, please specify
     
    
3. 
 
 What is your age group?*
   Below 21   21 to 30   31 to 40   41 to 50   above 50  
   
4. 
 
Which education level did you achieve?*
 
 
No education   Diploma   Bachelor   Master   PhD  
Other, please specify
     
    
5. 
 
What is your position in your organisation?*
 
 
Employee   Chief employee   Middle management   Management   Member of the board  
Other, please specify
     
    
6. 
 
In which field does your organisation operate?*
 Chemical / Pharmaceutical
APPENDIX 
 147 
  
07/12/2017 Last page
https://www.selectsurvey.ethz.ch/Print.aspx?SurveyID=78L24661&Title=Y&Breaks=N&AllPages=Y&Pages= 3/10
 
Banking & Finance
Administration
Energy
Telecommunication / IT
Insurance
Transport and logistic
Industry
Health
Other, please specify
     
    
7. 
 
Fow how many years have you overseen Security Information Sharing (SIS)?*
   Not in charge   less than 1   1 to 3   3 to 6   over 6  
   
8. 
 
What is the workload related to SIS in your organisation (in full­time equivalent)?*
 
 
0
0­1
1­2
2­3
over 3
   
9. 
 
How would you rate your general level of IT knowledge*
   Excellent   Good   Neutral   Fair   Poor  
   
10. How many people work in your organisation?*
   1   1 ­ 20   20 ­ 100   100 ­ 250   over 250  
   
11. In which year did your organisation become a member of MELANI?*
  
   
12. Have you participated in MELANI workshops / events?*
  
   
13. What is the level of IT outsourcing in your organisation?*
   Very Significant   Significant   Neutral   Insignificant   Very Insignificant  
   
14. What is the level of internationalisation of your organisation (shareholding, clients, subsidiaries, etc.)?*
   Very Significant   Significant   Neutral   Insignificant   Very Insignificant  
   
15. What is your level of satisfaction with MELANI services?*
   Very Satisfied   Satisfied   Neutral   Dissatisfied   Very Dissatisfied  
   
16. How are your personal relationships with your peers (other MELANI participants)?*
   Very Friendly   Friendly   Neutral   Unfriendly   Very Unfriendly  
   
17. Which amount of exclusive information do you receive through SIS with MELANI?
   Very Small   Small   Neutral   Large   Very Large  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Frequency
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  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences, and not on behalf of
your organisation!
   
18. Generally, I have a lot of information to share*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
19. I frequently share my experience about information security with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
20. I frequently share my information security knowledge with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
21. I frequently share my information security documents with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
22. I frequently share my expertise from my information security training with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
23. I frequently talk with others about information security incidents and their solutions in MELANI workshops*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
24. I share a new information with other participants*
 
 
Never
Rarely, in less than 10% of the chances when I could have
Occasionally, in about 30% of the chances when I could have
Sometimes, in about 50% of the chances when I could have
Frequently, in about 70% of the chances when I could have
Usually, in about 90% of the chances I could have
Every time
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Intensity
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences, and not on behalf of
your organisation!
   
25. How often do you comment on shared information?*
 
 
Never
Rarely, in less than 10% of the chances when I could have
Occasionally, in about 30% of the chances when I could have
Sometimes, in about 50% of the chances when I could have
Frequently, in about 70% of the chances when I could have
Usually, in about 90% of the chances I could have
Every time
   
26. How intensely do you react to the comments of other participants?*
 
 
Not at all
Little
Moderate
Significant
Always
   
27. I often react to comments in the community*
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  Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
28. I often use the community to provide comments*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
29. I comment in the community as much as possible*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
30. I am very interested in sharing knowlege with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
31. I usually spend a lot of time reacting to comments*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
32. I usually actively share my knowledge with MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Value of information
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of your organisation! 
   
33. I believe SIS is a useful behavioral tool to safeguard the organization's information assets*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
34. My SIS has a positive effect on mitigating the risk of information security breaches*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
35. SIS is a wise behavior that decreases the risk of information security incidents*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
36. SIS would decrease the time needed for my job responsibilities*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
37. SIS would increase the effectiveness of performing job tasks*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
38. Considering all aspects, SIS would be useful*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
39. I can’t seem to find the time to share knowledge in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
40. It is laborious to share knowledge in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
41. It takes me too much time to share knowledge in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
42. The effort is high for me to share knowledge in the community*
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  Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Reciprocity
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of
your organisation!
   
43. I believe that it is fair and obligatory to help others because I know that other people will help me some day*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
44. I believe that other people will help me when I need help if I share knowledge with others through MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
45. I believe that other people will answer my questions regarding specific information and knowledge in the future if I
share knowledge with others through MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
46. I think that people who are involved with MELANI develop reciprocal beliefs on give and take based on other
people's intentions and behavior*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
47. I expect to be rewarded with a higher salary in return for sharing knowledge with other participants*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
48. I expect to receive monetary rewards (i.e. additional bonus) in return for sharing knowledge with other
participants*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
49. I expect to receive opportunities to learn from others in return for sharing knowledge with other participants*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
50. I expect to be rewarded with an increased job security in return for sharing knowledge with other participants*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
51. My acts of knowledge sharing and seeking strengthen the ties of obligation between existing participants*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
52. My acts of knowledge sharing and seeking create the obligations with other members within MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
53. My acts of knowledge sharing and seeking expand the scope of my association with other members within MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
54. My acts of knowledge sharing and seeking will encourage cooperation among MELANI participants in the future*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
55. My acts of knowledge sharing and seeking create strong relationships with members who have common interests
within MELANI*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
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Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Institutional design
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of your organisation!
 
   
56. A centralized sharing model ­ such as a relational database like a forum ­ would allow me to engage in more SIS
activities*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
57. A decentralized sharing model ­ such as a distributed database like blockchain ­ would encourage me to engage in
more SIS activities*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
58. Formalization would allow me to engage in more SIS activities*
 Formalization is the extent to which work roles are structured in an organization, and the activities of the employees are governed by rules
and procedures.
  Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
59. Standardization would allow me to engage in more SIS activities*
 Standardization is the process of implementing and developing technical standards based on the consensus of different parties.
  Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
60. SIS is of value in my organization*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
61. The management appreciates employees for their SIS*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
62. The management awards employees for their SIS*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
63. The management encourages employees to utilise SIS*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Reputation
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of your organisation!
 
   
64. Sharing knowledge can enhance my reputation in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
65. I get praises from others by sharing knowledge in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
66. I feel that knowledge sharing improves my status in the community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
67. I can earn some feedback or rewards through knowledge sharing that represent my reputation and status in the
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community*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
68. My colleagues respect me when I share my information security knowledge*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
69. The others have a positive opinion when I share my information security knowledge*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
70. The management asked me to help others in terms of information security*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
71. Employees have a positive image about me due to their evaluation of my information security knowledge*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
Trust
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of your organisation!
 
   
72. I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is reliable*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
73. I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is effective*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
74. I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge mitigates the risk of information security breaches*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
75. I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is useful*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
76. I believe that my colleagues would not take advantage of my information security knowledge that we share*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
77. I believe that people in my network give credit for each other's knowledge where it is due*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
78. I believe that people in my network respond when I am in need*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
79. I believe that people in my network use each other's knowledge appropriately*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
80. I believe that my requests for knowledge will be answered*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
81. I believe that people in my network share the best knowledge that they have*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
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Incentives and Security Information Sharing
You are almost at the end of the survey
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of
your organisation!
   
82. SIS satisfies my desire for acquiring information security skills*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
83. SIS satisfies my sense of curiosity*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
84. I enjoy it when I gain knowledge about information security through knowledge sharing*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
85. I feel pleasure when I share my knowledge about information security*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
86. I am interested in SIS*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
87. I have the necessary knowledge about information security to share with the other staff*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
88. I have the ability to share information security knowledge to mitigate the risk of information security breaches*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
89. SIS is an easy and enjoyable task for me*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
90. I have the useful resources to share SIS with the other employees*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
91. I am willing to share my information security knowledge because of its potential to reduce cyber risks*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
92. I will share my information security experiences with my colleagues to increase their cyber threat awareness*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
93. I will inform the other staff about new methods and software that can reduce the risk of information security*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
94. I will share the report on information security incidents with others, in order to reduce the risk*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
Incentives and Security Information Sharing
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Last page
  Please answer the questions based on your personal experiences and not on behalf of your organisation!
 
   
95. According to your experience, the number of participants in the MELANI closed circle is*
   Very Small   Small   Neutral   Large   Very Large  
   
96. I prefer to engage in SIS activities that involves participants from the entire Critical Infrastructure closed circle
("Geschlossene Kundenkreis" / "cercle fermé")*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
97. I prefer to engage in SIS activities that involves participants from my industry*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
98. I prefer to engage in SIS activities that involves participants from the MELANI staff only*
   Strongly Agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly Disagree  
   
99. Do you want to leave a general comment on this study?
 For instance, you can describe your personal incentives and barriers to engage in SIS activities or your favorite service provided by
MELANI.
 
   
100. Upon request, you will be delivered with a precise picture of how your organisation compares to others. If you
decide to receive this reward, please enter your e­mail address below. It will only be disclosed to the study leader.
 
 
   
  Again, thank you very much for your cooperation! Best regards, Alain Mermoud, PhD candidate
 Study leader
 alain.mermoud@milak.ethz.ch
 +4158 484 82 99
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